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Abstract
The dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay we study the efficiency of banks during the
period of (2000-2017) that witnessed a fierce financial crisis in the light of the regulatory acts enacted in
response to the crisis (Basel III 2010). We investigate the combined impact of compliance with Tier 1 and
Tier 2 capital, common equity Tier 1, and leverage requirements on bank operating efficiency. We
measure operational efficiency of 68 insured, U.S. federally and state-chartered, commercial banks, with
consolidated assets of $15 billion or more, over a sampling period of 18 years. We seek to identify
whether different dimensions of bank regulation are efficient in stabilizing US financial system by
improving efficiency of large commercial banks; whether they impede bank efficiency by limiting its risktaking endeavors and tightening its capital usage; or whether no impact on efficiency exists altogether.
We build an empirical model measuring the impact of capital and leverage regulation and credit risk on
banks’ operational efficiency. Empirical findings show a positive and statistically significant impact of
capital adequacy on operating efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks, with common equity Tier 1
having more power in determining efficiency. Leverage requirements and net charge-offs are also found
to be significant determinants that promote bank operating efficiency. In the second essay we investigate
determinants for government’s choice of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds. Using a sample of
143 sovereign Sukuk and 602 sovereign conventional bonds issued in 16 OIC countries during (20002015), we analyze factors affecting the government's choice of employing sovereign Sukuk structure as
substitute to sovereign bonds instruments. Results suggest that countries having developed financial
markets, higher credit quality, and strong economic and financial prospects are more likely to issue
sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds, mainly as a strategy to diversify and develop their current
debt markets by introducing newly-developed debt tools. However, countries with weaker economic and
financial indicators are more likely to opt for the classic sovereign bonds. We conclude that government’s
choice of sovereign debt is mainly determined by a country’s financial characteristics, macroeconomic
indicators and certain specific events.

JEL Classification: G2, G180, G1, G21, F3, P4

Keywords: Financial Institutions and Services, Financial Crisis, Banks and Depository
Institutions, Banking Regulation, Financial Markets, International Finance, Islamic Economic
System, Sovereign Debt Issuance, Emerging Markets
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CHAPTER 1

The Ten Year Anniversary of the Global Financial Crisis: a Look at Financial Regulation
Impact on the Efficiency of U.S. Commercial Banks

1.

Introduction
It is on September 15, 2008 that the fourth-largest investment bank in the U.S., Lehman

Brothers, filed for the largest bankruptcy protection in U.S. history. Lehman Brothers and other
major financial institutions in the U.S. were trapped in a subprime mortgage crisis, fueled by
the 2007-2008 mortgage bubble, where major financial institutions were originating mortgages
to less credit-worthy borrowers and issuing mortgage-backed securities. This asset-backed
security issuance strategy soon fired back when borrowers started defaulting on their
mortgages and the number of foreclosures sky-rocketed at unprecedented rates, giving rise to
one of the fiercest financial crises that not only swept the U.S. by its feet but also ballooned to be
dubbed the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.
Financial crises are known to inflict large and unrelenting social costs, highlighting the
relevance of banking stability (Thakor, 2014). Commercial banks, the backbone of the financial
system in the U.S., were in the midst of this heated situation. Through a myriad of financial
services such as depository, saving, loan initiating, intermediation, treasury management,
facilitation of payment services, etc., commercial banks sustainability and soundness are crucial
to the overall prosperity of business and finance within any country.
As of December 31, 2017, there were 1,827 insured, U.S. chartered commercial banks,
each with consolidated assets of $300 million or more, adding to total consolidated assets
amounting to $15.56 trillion compared to 1,739 commercial banks with total consolidated assets
of $11.03 trillion in December 31, 2009, with close to 300 banks going under between 2009 and
2010.1
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We relied on the December 31, 2017 Federal Reserve Statistical Release to obtain the list of banks.
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The 15 large banks in the U.S. banking system in December 31, 2017, constitute 64% of
the sector, with a total consolidated asset size of approximately $10 trillion. The large five banks
alone (J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, Wells Fargo Bank, Citibank, and US Bank)
control about 47.97% share of the U.S. banking industry with an approximate total of $7.46
trillion in consolidated assets.2
In spite of the changing economic climate causing earnings in the banking industry to
fluctuate, annual revenues for large U.S. banks are projected to rise to nearly $24 trillion by
2019.3
The current and near future outlook for the banking sector is promising. The KBW
Nasdaq Bank Index, a benchmark stock for the banking industry, with 24 banking stocks
representative of large U.S. national money center banks and regional banks, has been up 23%
since recent Presidential elections of 2016, with investors expecting the Federal Reserve (Fed) to
hike interest rates, which will increase the banking sector’s profitability. There have also been
recent talks that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration is contemplating an ease of
regulation of the sector.
For the sake of showcasing how our study came about, we will devote the next section
to covering banking regulation throughout the main three sub-periods that reshaped not only
the banking sector in the U.S. but also the whole financial system within the last eighteen years.
Regulation pre-crisis (2000-2006):
Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, regulators prioritized certain prudential
regulations, federal deposit insurance, in addition to the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending
power, as measures of limiting the risk of commercial bank failures (Sykes, 2018). Performed by
three U.S. government agencies or federal regulators in the caliber of the Federal Reserve Board,
the FDIC, and the OCC, bank regulation is conducted at multi-level, i.e. federal and state-level.

2
3

We relied on the December 31, 2017 Federal Reserve Statistical Release to obtain the list of banks.
We obtained this statistic from statista.com

2

Banks can choose the type of charter they can operate under; which impacts the type of
regulation they become subject to.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Congress was warned about suspicious, fraudulent, and
predatory lending practices many banks were engaged in; and many calls were issued to the
Federal Reserve to step in and rectify those malpractices. This puts the financial regulation in
hot waters, since its main role of overseeing and closely monitoring banks and financial
institutions’ operations fell short and a financial crisis took the U.S by storm.
In fact, the credit crisis that followed thereafter highlighted the necessity for banks to be
tightly regulated than before. With banks playing a vital role in the stability of the financial
market and the economy in general, as well as the welfare of depositors and investors alike,
strict bank regulation is highly recommended to prevent bank malfeasance and thus protect the
financial system from unforeseen risks and uncertainties.

Regulation during the crisis (2007-2009):
The recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) was unparalleled in its scope and severity
in that it wreaked havoc throughout the highly interconnected global financial system,
instigated an enormous stress for financial markets around the world, and caused asset prices to
plunge and credit flows to American households and businesses to be disrupted.
The collapse or near-demise of some of the world's largest financial firms shocked U.S.
and global economies, leading to steep declines in production levels, and costing millions
around the world their employments. Although many bank regulations were in effect, bank
failures in the wake of the 2007-2009 crisis unraveled the vulnerable regulation situation.
As far as bank failures in the US are concerned, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) reports that 462 banks failed from 2008 to 2012 and had to be closed; as
opposed to only 29 bank failures prior to the crisis (2000-2006), and 62 banks post crisis (2013-
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2017).6 FDIC administers special insolvency regime where it rapidly resolves failed banks
outside of the Bankruptcy Code.
The unprecedented number of failing banks in the midst of the crisis alerted policy
makers to a steep inadequacy of bank regulation and ill-supervision and soon enough, they
were in route to designate the catalyst behind the trouble. It is because large financial
institutions suffered from low and insufficient levels of high-quality capital (HQC), had too few
high-quality liquid assets (HQLA); and engaged in inadequate risk measurement and
management systems, banks were getting in deep trouble.
As a response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, those agencies have taken drastic
measures in the form of stricter bank supervisory and regulatory pressures to prevent similar
dire circumstances from reoccurring in the near future. The goal of possible reforms is a clearcut one, i.e. to efficiently reduce not only the possibility of future systemic financial crises, but
also their social and financial costs, boosting economic growth and welfare in the process
(Claessens & Kodres, 2014).
As a part of the regulatory effort post-crisis in the US, the Treasury established several
programs under Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) as of October 2008 as a drastic
measure to stabilize the U.S. financial system, jump-start economic growth, and rectify some of
the crisis’ spillovers. Shortly after, a total of $700 billion was authorized for TARP; although it
was subsequently reduced to only $475 billion by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 (U.S. Department
of Treasury).
Regulation post-crisis (2010-present):
Early in the beginning of 2009, the Federal Reserve initiated the stress test exercise in
order to determine whether banks have sufficient levels of capital to survive adverse economic
shocks, while responding to regulatory levels of minimum capital established under stress test
programs. As stipulated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the Fed started conducting annual
stress tests of any bank holding companies (BHCs) with $100 billion or more in total
consolidated assets. Starting October 2012, the rules carrying out this requirement were adopted
4

only to be modified in February 2017. The supervisory stress tests of identified banks that fit the
criteria are conducted by the Fed, which reports on, among other things, the methodologies
used to generate the Fed’s forecasts.
This crisis caused many banks and financial institutions to withstand critically low levels
of capital, even becoming under-capitalized, a situation that stress tests aim to prevent.
The Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) set the Basel Accord, a three
series of banking regulations (Basel I, II, and III) to produce recommendations relating to bank
capital adequacy, accounting and auditing, banking problems, core principles for effective
banking supervision, credit risk and securitization, credit, market, and operational risk,
transparency and disclosure, among others (BIS). In the wake of the credit crisis, it became
mandatory for banks to maintain proper leverage ratios and meet minimum capital
requirements. Higher capital levels are essential to guarantee financial stability as they help
create and boost liquidity levels, in addition to increasing probabilities of surviving crises
(Thakor, 2014).
Basel III also advanced two new types of required liquidity ratios. Similar to the reserve
requirements that were abolished by many Basel member countries including the U.S, the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a new regulatory tool destined to require banks to hold High
Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) sufficient to cover net cash outflows over a period of 30 days as a
measure of promoting short-term resilience. The LCR rule was implemented in 2014 but banks
were expected to fully comply with it by January 2017, with a minimum compliance rate of
100%. The second liquidity requirement is carried out by the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR),
a requirement that promotes long-term resilience by requiring banks to maintain an available
amount of stable funding that is higher than the one required over one-year stress period4
In the wake of the mayhem instilled by the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse, in addition
to poor bank governance and lousy risk management practices, the Basel III was the latest of
4

This information was obtained from the 2018 FMA presentation in san Diego by Dr. Christa Bouwman, Patricia &
Bookman Peters Professor of Finance - Texas A&M University, under the title “Bank Capital and Financial Crises”.
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Basel Accord frameworks to be developed in response to the ensuing financial crisis of 20072009. Aiming to update and reinforce the regulation, prudential oversight, and risk
management of banks, the standards of Basel III set minimum requirements that apply to active
member banks (BIS).
The Congress also passed a comprehensive financial reform of financial regulation
under the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. According to
the 2011 testimony by Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, the objectives of this act are clear-cut and
aim to 1) facilitate regulators’ mission of closely monitoting and handling the threats to financial
stability that arise from institutions dubbed “Too Big To Fail”, 2) intensify the prudential
oversight and supervision over systematicall important financia institutions (SIFIs), and 3)
enhance the capability of financial markets to cope with unforeseen risks and shocks. Through
its Financial Stability Oversight Council, the DF Act coordinates efforts to identify and attenuate
any possible threats to the stability of U.S. financial system and that of institutions and markets
within the U.S. (Federal Reserve).
Current Banking Outlook:
The latest 2019 Banking and Capital Markets Outlook by Deloitte paints an optimistic
picture of the current outlook for banks in the U.S. thanks to strong economic fundamentals
(favorable GDP growth, tax cuts, and rising interest rates) and a favorable regulatory climate
(aggressive policy interventions and forceful regulations). One decade after the global financial
crisis of 2007-2009, the banking industry seems to be finally on firmer grounds with a little over
$17 trillion in total assets, higher capital levels, and higher efficiency ratios. Other metrics
showcasing the robustness of the banking sector are the volume of non-performing loans and
the number of failed banks.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation.
Section 3 covers the contribution. Section 4 presents the literature review. Section 5 describes
data and methodology. Section 6 discusses hypotheses development. Section 7 presents
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descriptive statistics. Section 8 discusses regression results. Section 9 presents our empirical
findings. Section 10 concludes.
2.

Financial regulation, financial stability, and lessons from the recent financial
crisis
As we know, a decade has passed since the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 and as of

today, financial regulation is still at the center of heated debates. We take advantage of the
opportunity of ten-year anniversary of the financial crisis to shed the light on the role of
financial regulation in managing the repercussions of the financial crisis and study the plan of
action that was put forth in the aftermath of the crisis to counter-attack its detrimental effects,
and to lower chances of its reoccurring in the near future. We plan to do so by analyzing the
impact of recent regulatory updates post-crisis on the efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks.
More importantly, the majority of the studies that examine the impact of bank regulation
on bank efficiency are either clustered around the crisis time or pre-crisis era, too general and
looking at banks at the international level, or exclusively focus on foreign countries. Barth et al.
(2013) for example, explores the role of bank regulation, supervising, and monitoring in
promoting or impeding bank operating efficiency using a bank observations from 72 countries;
while Ghosh et al. (2006) also investigate the relationship between capital regulation and bank
efficiency for Indian, state-owned banks. More recent studies mostly deal with non-U.S.
financial institutions such as Pradhan et al. (2017) who examine the effect of capital adequacy on
financial performance of Nepalese commercial banks, as proxied by bank operating efficiency
levels; Odunga (2013) who studies the operating efficiency, liquidity, and capital adequacy of
commercial banks in Kenya, and Lotto (2018) who empirically examines the impact of bank
capital regulations on the operating efficiency of banks in Tanzania.
Moreover, some of the major trending topics nowadays are lessons learned from the
financial crisis; and how close we may be to the next one. Inquiries about the well-being and
sustainability of the financial system and whether it has recovered or not are often brought up
in every discussion panel. Finally, there is a large concern from stakeholders about preventative
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measures and whether the current regulatory measures in place, are efficient in preventing the
next financial crisis.
Motivated by previous studies, especially (Berger and Bowman, 2013) and (Thakor,
2014), this paper looks specifically at possible determinants of performance of large commercial
banks by examining the recent capital and leverage regulatory requirements in the U.S., in a
quest to help policy makers evaluate the recent requirements imposed on banks in the
aftermath of the crisis. We have chosen to designate operating efficiency as a proxy for
performance measure in this study since the concept of efficiency for banks is deeply rooted in
the literature.
This study focuses solely on large commercial bank with $15 billion or higher in
consolidated assets as of December 31, 2017. We have previously highlighted the importance of
large commercial banks in the US as they the backbone of local and national economies, in that
they control massive assets, provide reliable lending, and recent studies show they are destined
for more growth and expansion by 2019.
Another equally important motive to dig deeper into this topic are the recent talks about
dismantling the Dodd Frank Act of 2010, which is considered as one of the pillars of the
financial regulation post-crisis. In January 2018, Randal Quarles, the Vice Chairman for Bank
Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board expressed his concern about current regulations in
banking industry being standardized and extreme. He also demanded those regulations to be
softened and customized to promote commercial bank activities such as lending, investment,
and stock market trading.

3.

Regulation Impact on Efficiency of Financial System and Banks post financial
crisis
We aim to enrich the literature on the effect of financial regulation on the operating

efficiency of U.S. commercial banks, measured as the ratio of operating expenses to operating
income, through a specific study that is to our knowledge, the first to be carried out for large

8

U.S. commercial banks. Our goal is to study the combined effects of regulatory capital, liquidity,
common equity, and leverage requirements on banks’ operational efficiency.
This essay speaks to current affairs and fuels the discussion and debates regarding
regulation of the banking industry and financial system. To our knowledge, this is the first
study that looks at a multi-dimensional impact of regulation. Berger and Patti (2006) used U.S.
bank sample and the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation method to study the
effect of bank regulations on bank profitability; their findings show that low levels of capital
ratios increase the operating efficiency of banks. We are expanding that research topic by not
only including an additional ten years of data, but also measuring the impact of leverage
requirements on banks’ performance.
Furthermore, we also test new regulatory measures introduced in the aftermath of the
crisis through Basel III, by looking at the sub-components of the capital requirements, namely,
the impact of the Tier 1, Tier 2, and common equity capital regulation. As recent capital
requirements advanced by Basel III called for a stricter regulatory scheme by increasing and
even sometimes doubling requirements, this study sheds the light on the efficacy of those steps
as measured through the efficiency of banks subject to those requirements. The study also aims
to reconcile the contradicting results on the impact of financial regulation on bank efficiency
and to paint a clearer picture for policy makers. Mixed results have been reported regarding
that impact. For example, Diamond and Rajan (2001) associated additional capital with negative
consequences, while Berger & Bouwman (2013) found a positive association between higher
levels of capital and a better performance of medium and large banks primarily during times of
financial turmoil.
We hope that our results contribute the ongoing debate of whether recent financial
regulation made a difference in improving the general financial climate by pushing banks and
financial institutions in the U.S. into the right direction, or it has impeded bank performance by
imposing far stringent requirements and controlling the risk-taking behavior of banks.
Eventually, our attempt of studying if current financial regulations are indeed too rigid and
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need to be relaxed will help rule in favor of or against views calling for an abolition of the Dodd
Frank Act of 2010.5

4.

Literature Review
4.1 On Bank Efficiency and Capital Regulation
Efficiency refers to an individual or organization’s ability to generate a desired outcome

with the least of efforts and expenditures (Cooper, 2004). Efficiency falls under two broad
categories; an economic efficiency that is seen from the perspective of an economy as a whole
and an operational efficiency that is considered by the individual business enterprise.6
Generally speaking, operational efficiency refers to the efficient utilization of human and
material resources, such as machines, tools equipment, materials, or funds. In the banking
sector, the concept of efficiency is similar, as it is focused on maintaining a healthy balance
between cost (input) and productivity (output). Moreover, research analysts look at the
importance of operational efficiency at the banking sector from multiple different perspectives
to highlight why bank efficiency is of primordial importance.
For instance, depositors trust an efficient bank with their deposits, which creates less
hostile environment for bank runs or chaos when a crisis unfolds. Shareholders view in an
efficient bank the opportunity of higher returns, in addition to providing a more stable and
solid investment climate.
From a regulator point of view, efficient banks are a cornerstone to the prosperity of the
financial system and of the overall economy; they play a major role in guaranteeing a stable
economic environment and their failure can be extremely costly, even giving rise to massive
financial disturbances, as was the case in 2007. In brief, the efficiency of banks has always been a

5

Since it passed in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act has been the target of animosity by many conservatives and the banking industry.
On May 22, 2018, the Congress approved a bill to dismantle parts of the Dodd-Frank banking rule to lessen scrutiny on lending
practices for mid-size banks
6
Visit http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/24126/10/10_chapter4.pdf for a Chapter on Operational Efficiency in
Banking Sector in India- A Conceptual Framework/ Chapter 4.
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matter of serious interest to the regulators, stakeholders, clients, and managers alike. Given the
importance of bank efficiency, many scholars made it their priority to gauge how bank
efficiency affects stability, while others looked at possible determinants of efficiency. Our study
builds upon previous studies in examining whether regulatory pressures in the form of capital
and leverage requirements could possibly determine bank operating efficiency.
The majority of previous studies focus on capital regulation, thus scrutinizing the
relationship between capital regulatory requirements and bank efficiency. With bank capital
being of uttered importance in the resilience, survival, and prosperity of banks, one view that
emerged regarding the role of capital regulation is the “Traditional View”. In discussing the role
of capital regulation, Kashyap et al. (2008) summarize the Traditional View as resting on four
premises: protecting the deposit insurer and society against the adverse impact of bank failures;
aligning incentives of shareholders and management; charging higher capital for riskier assets
and forcing banks with a history of trouble to be re-authorized from the capital market before
they could continue operating. Kashyap et al. (2008) also discuss the main flaws in that view as
presented in the Basel I and II frameworks.
In fact, there exist mixed views concerning the manner regulatory power influences
bank efficiency. From the one hand, Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor (2011) detect a positive
relationship between capital regulation and bank performance, while addressing bank capital
concerns such as why banks are highly levered and the consequences of this leverage for the
economy. Thakor (2014) directs his research effort towards exposing the role played by capital
in creating and sustaining financial stability, only to conclude that “higher capital requirements
seem beneficial”.
From the other hand, other studies report contradicting findings, such as Berger & Patti
(2006) who use U.S. bank sample to study the impact of bank regulations on bank profitability,
and find that the operating efficiency of banks increases with lower capital ratios; Diamond and
Rajan (2001) designate some negative consequences of large levels of capital; while Calomiris &
Kahn (1991) find that bank performance is adversely affected by tighter capital regulation.
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Chortareas, Girardone, & Ventouri (2010) conclude that interventionist supervisory &
regulatory policies significantly obstruct efficient operations of banks. Interestingly, in a later
study that examines how capital requirements influence the operating efficiency of commercial
bank in 22 EU countries, Chortareas et al., (2010) find that higher levels of capital requirements
improve operation efficiency of banks, rather than hampering it.
Finally, there is the neutral view that argues that compliance with regulatory
requirements has a marginal effect on bank efficiency. Adding further evidence to support this
view, Ayadi et al. (2016) conclude in a recent study that compliance with either Basel Core
Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) or with any of its individual chapters, is not
associated with bank operating efficiency whatsoever, and that result holds after controlling for
several characteristics at the bank level, the macroeconomic level, and institutional quality.
Their claim corroborates the argument that compliance impact on bank efficiency is a frail one.
Berger & Bouwman (2013) achieve different results after they empirically examine the
impact of capital on bank’s performance and reveal that indeed, capital ameliorates the
performance of medium and large banks especially during times of increased financial turmoil.
Another equally-important finding is that higher levels of capital improve small banks’ survival
chances and increase their market share at all times.
In carrying out this study, we believe it is extremely important to fully understand the
regulator’s rationale behind setting up statutory requirements and forcing banks to abide by
them. Inherently, the banking industry is a risky one since not only does it respond to interest
rates fluctuations and is subject to frictions arising from banks being fiercely competitive
competitors; but it is also based on lending activities that may sometimes prove detrimental in
case of non-performing loans or outright default. Thus, from the regulator’s standpoint, banks
are expected to be well-capitalized in the face of uncertainties and unforeseen crises. Meeting or
even better, exceeding capital requirements, puts not only the bank at ease, but also the whole
banking and closely-related financial sector. Increasing capital adequacy of banks is then one of
the life-long goals of regulators in their quest of guaranteeing a safe and sound economic
environment.
12

One more advantage for being well-capitalized is explained by Thakor (1996) whose
findings suggest that larger levels of capital increase banks’ financial capabilities in seeking
profitable endeavors and projects, develop operations, and tackle higher levels of risk. On the
other hand, banks that suffer from limited capital, hence under-capitalized, tend to refrain from
the risky practice of investing large sums in lending activities, and opt to invest in riskless
government securities, which may be a far less profitable route. Similarly, claims made by
Berger & Patti (2006) support the notion that banks’ risk-taking activities become limited upon
going beyond the minimum regulatory capital ratios.
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) articulate several broad principles for reform and offer
one specific recommendation in terms of capital insurance to be implemented on an opt-in
basis, in combination with other reforms. Kashyap et al. (2008) also discuss governance issues in
banks in addition to excessive short-term leverage; they argue that direct regulatory
interventions, especially in the form of requiring more capital, could indeed aggravate private
sector attempts to solve them, as well as hinder economic growth and stability. At the same
time, continuous efforts to rescue the banking system may be extremely costly for society;
similarly, exposing the economy to the financial created by banking crises create could also
carry several costs.
Berger & Bouwman (2013) acknowledge that literature presents many divergent views
of this topic, claiming that issues such as the effects of capital on the performance of banks, the
frequency and magnitude of these effects, and the degree to which they are different according
to the nature of the crisis is worthy of lengthy discussions.
Ayadi et al. (2016) also contribute to the ongoing policy debate by shedding light on
compliance issues, through assessing the effectiveness of complying with international bodies
of regulation on bank supervision in enhancing bank operating efficiency. They focus on
regulatory compliance and defend their focus by the fact that the former can affect bank
performance through a multitude of channels, such as lending; asset allocation; or funding
decisions. They also find that regulatory compliance is costly for banks.
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4.2 On Regulatory Requirements and Financial Crisis:
Discussions of the supervisory role of the government and other governing authorities
are often renewed in the event of a crisis. Government’s regulatory intervention has been
approached in several studies. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2004) study the impact of
different bank supervisory policies in easing or intensifying bank corruption as an obstacle to
firms’ activities. They highlight the striking differences among several approaches to
supervision and among theories focusing on the role of the government within the economy.
Among of the theories discussed in their study is the Supervision theory that argues
governments possess both the expertise and the incentives to improve market imperfections
and ameliorate the banks’ governance. An alternative theory that distances capital regulation
from any possible impact of bank efficiency would be the Political-Regulatory Capture View
that assumes politicians and supervisors alike are more concerned with their own welfare in
lieu of maximizing the social welfare (Becker, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Finally, the
Private Empowerment View argues that improving incentives and capabilities of private agents
should become the main priority of bank supervisory policies in order to curtail information
and transaction costs; it also seeks to encourage supervisors to foster necessary responsibility
and authority to encourage a more transparent disclosure of banks’ accurate information to the
general public (Hay and Shleifer, 1998).
Long before the recent crisis shook the U.S. financial markets to their very core, studies
highlighted the necessity of supervisory authorities in steering the governance of banks and
financial institutions to a safe harbor. Beck et al. (2004) claim that the Basel Committee,
International Monetary Fund and World Bank aim to encourage the development of strong
bank supervisory agencies through directly monitoring and firmly disciplining banks. When
the crisis hit, regulators had to take drastic measures in response, whether through tightening
controls, requiring higher capital buffers, or imposing new laws to counter-attack the
detrimental effect of the crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, many studies found it appropriate
to revisit the regulation effect topic. For example, Claessens & Kodres (2014) discuss the
regulatory reactions to the recent global financial crisis to date; and in the light of lessons from
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recent and past financial crises and insights from analytical and empirical studies, they identify
the challenges faced in enabling and promoting a stable and efficient financial system. They
identify three tenets necessary for reforms, mainly maintaining a system-wide outlook to tackle
market failures; align the incentives and goals of both regulations agents and society and admit
that a potential risk for crisis will always exist, regardless of preventative efforts.
Financial crises pose serious threats to the stability of any financial system around the
world. Following a study on the impact of capital on financial stability, Thakor (2014) claims
that financial crises breed large, persistent social costs, emphasizing the importance of banking
stability. Thakor (2014) also credits higher capital levels with lowering the probability of bank
insolvencies and crises, in addition to speeding up the post-crisis recovery of the economy,
thanks to better-capitalized banks having stronger screening incentives (Coval & Thakor, 2005)
and monitoring incentives (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; Mehran & Thakor, 2011) to give them an
edge in lending; a view that many banks do not completely agree with. In fact, many large
CEOs expressed their dislike of higher capital requirements and voiced out their blunt
resistance. Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, claims in his April 2017
annual letter to shareholders that banks have excessive levels of capital, while Lloyd Blankfein,
Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs, argues at a February 2017 investor conference7 that they
would prefer to hold far less levels of capital if they had a choice.
Quotes like these in our opinion only corroborate that banks need strong supervision
and a uniform body of regulatory policies to keep the banking sector in check and far from
CEO’s and large block holders’ whims. In response to increased demands to relax the tight
restrictions on capital, Thakor (2014) explains this behavior by a handful of possible reasons
such as tax benefit of debt, funding cost advantage, catering to ROE-focused investors, and the
fact that CEO bonuses are tied to ROE.
A total of 465 insured U.S. commercial banks failed between January 2008 and December
2012. Governments’ current supervisory tools such as guaranteeing a certain level of capital

7
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adequacy among banks reflect the government’s sincere concern about what a potential
financial crisis may bring about in terms of insolvency, distress, and failure.
According to Sykes (2018), in the case of the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 and
similar crises, when systematically large banks and financial institutions become insolvent or
distressed, the burden falls on taxpayers through taxpayer-funded bailout (AIG 2007 massive
bailout for example), higher taxes, or the financial system gets destabilized, in what is known as
the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) problem. Sykes (2018) also claims that the recent crisis exposed not
only the inadequacy of micro-prudential regulation imposed on large financial institutions, but
also the bankruptcy system for resolving the insolvencies of such institutions. The TBTF
problem came under the radar during the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a noteworthy problem,
when several large banking institutions experienced rigorous distress, prompting the federal
government to initiate a massive bailout operation by committing hundreds of billions of
dollars as an intervention tactic to rescue those ailing institutions, and it did so for the sake of
restoring the stability of the financial system (Sykes, 2018).
In reaction to a financial crisis whose reach has expanded from affecting U.S. financial
markets to a widespread impact on the global financial system, former President Obama signed
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) into law in
2010, of which Titles I and II are specifically designed to minimize the systemic risk brought
about by financial institutions dubbed “too big to fail”.
The objective of financial regulation for the banking industry from the perspective of
regulators is clear-cut; i.e. to guide banks and financial institutions towards safety and solvency,
and ultimately grant the overall financial stability and minimize the potential of financial crises.
In spite of the resistance movement against higher capital requirements, deregulation of the
banking sector is far from being a reality due to the systemic importance of banks within the
economy.
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5.

Data & Methodology

5.1. Sample Collection
Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel of annual observations for 68 commercial
banks in the U.S., each with total consolidated assets of $15 billion or more, valued at 2017 U.S.
Dollars and spanning a period from 2000 to 2017. We carefully chose this time period to capture
the behavior of the impact of regulatory changes on the efficiency of U.S. commercial banks.
Our study is based on matching bank-level information with a multitude of bank regulatory
measures to investigate the dynamics of the relationship between bank efficiency and bank
regulation measures.
We retrieve annual data on U.S. commercial banks that satisfy the criteria of being a
member of the Federal Reserve in addition to being nationally or state-chartered. Our data
comes from FDIC Call Reports 2000: Q1-2017: Q4, in addition to being hand-collected from
participating banks’ financial statements and annual reports. The list of the 68 banks and their
characteristics as of December 31, 2017 is obtained from the Federal Reserve Board Statistical
Release of December, 31, 2017 and is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: List of Large U.S. Commercial Banks with Consolidated assets of $15 billion and Higher
Table 1 presents the list of 68 U.S. commercial banks, ranked in terms of their consolidated assets. The table shows banks that
satisfy our sampling criteria of being a member of the Federal Reserve in addition to being nationally or state-chartered. This
table comes from the Federal Reserve Board statistical release of December 31, 2017, which the Fed obtains from the
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income filed quarterly by banks (FFIEC 031 and 041) and from other information in the
Board's National Information Center database. Banks that are located in U.S. territories and possessions are not included in the
table.
Bank Name/ Holding Company Name

National
Rank

Bank ID

Bank Location

Charter

Consol.
Assets
($mil)

Domestic
assets
($mil)

JPMORGAN CHASE BK NA/
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO

1

852218

COLUMBUS, OH

NAT

2,140,778

1,649,874

BANK OF AMER NA/ BANK OF
AMER CORP

2

480228

CHARLOTTE, NC

NAT

1,751,524

1,642,198

3

451965

SIOUX FALLS, SD

NAT

1,747,354

1,688,983

4

476810

SIOUX FALLS, SD

NAT

1,384,707

845,800

5

504713

CINCINNATI, OH

NAT

456,026

444,720

6

817824

WILMINGTON, DE

NAT

370,002

365,906

WELLS FARGO BK NA/
FARGO & CO

WELLS

CITIBANK NA/ CITIGROUP
U S BK NA/

U S BC

PNC BK NA/ PNC FNCL SVC
GROUP

17

BANK OF NY MELLON/ BANK OF
NY MELLON CORP

7

541101

NEW YORK, NY

SMB

297,305

182,415

CAPITAL ONE NA /
FC

8

112837

MC LEAN, VA

NAT

290,651

290,581

TD GRP US HOLDS
LLC

9

497404

WILMINGTON, DE

NAT

288,294

288,294

STATE STREET B&TC / STATE
STREET CORP

10

35301

BOSTON, MA

SMB

235,022

151,127

SUNTRUST BK/ SUNTRUST BK

12

675332

ATLANTA, GA

SMB

201,638

201,638

HSBC BK USA NA / HSBC N AMER
HOLDS

13

413208

MC LEAN, VA

NAT

180,372

177,444

GOLDMAN SACHS BK USA /
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP THE

14

2182786

NEW YORK, NY

SMB

164,539

164,539

CHASE BK USA NA / JPMORGAN
CHASE & CO

15

489913

WILMINGTON, DE

NAT

143,801

143,801

FIFTH THIRD BK / FIFTH THIRD
BC

16

723112

CINCINNATI, OH

SMB

140,078

139,525

NORTHERN TC / NORTHERN TR
CORP

17

210434

CHICAGO, IL

SMB

138,163

92,313

ALLY FNCL

18

3284070

SANDY, UT

SMB

137,474

137,474

KEYBANK NA / KEYCORP

19

280110

CLEVELAND, OH

NAT

135,758

135,733

MORGAN STANLEY BK NA/
MORGAN STANLEY

20

1456501

SALT LAKE CITY,
UT

NAT

129,707

129,707

REGIONS BK /

21

233031

BIRMINGHAM, AL

SMB

123,325

123,325

CITIZENS BK NA / CITIZENS FNCL
GRP

22

3303298

PROVIDENCE, RI

NAT

121,996

121,996

CAPITAL ONE BK USA NA /
CAPITAL ONE FC

23

2253891

GLEN ALLEN, VA

NAT

119,556

118,325

MUFG UNION BK NA / MUFG
AMERS HOLDS CORP

24

212465

SAN FRANCISCO,
CA

NAT

118,537

118,533

MANUFACTURERS & TRADERS TC /
M&T BK CORP

25

501105

BUFFALO, NY

SMB

118,072

118,072

26

75633

CHICAGO, IL

NAT

109,373

109,373

HUNTINGTON NB / HUNTINGTON
BSHRS

27

12311

COLUMBUS, OH

NAT

104,052

104,052

COMPASS BK / BBVA COMPASS
BSHRS

31

697633

BIRMINGHAM, AL

SMB

86,505

86,505

SANTANDER BK NA /
SANTANDER HOLDS USA

32

722777

WILMINGTON, DE

NAT

74,450

74,436

COMERICA BK / COMERICA

33

60143

DALLAS, TX

SMB

71,609

71,097

T D BK NA/

ALLY BK /

CAPITAL ONE

REGIONS FC

BMO HARRIS BK NA /
CORP

BMO FNCL

18

34

276579

SALT LAKE CITY,
UT

NAT

66,081

66,081

MORGAN STANLEY PRIV BK NA /
MORGAN STANLEY

35

2489805

PURCHASE, NY

NAT

65,127

65,127

SILICON VALLEY BK

36

802866

SMB

50,388

48,225

CITY NB

37

63069

SANTA CLARA,
CA
LOS ANGELES, CA

NAT

47,934

47,934

PEOPLES UNITED BK NA

38

613307

BRIDGEPORT, CT

NAT

44,198

44,198

DEUTSCHE BK TC AMERICAS

39

214807

NEW YORK, NY

SMB

43,390

43,390

FIRST TN BK NA

41

485559

MEMPHIS, TN

NAT

41,201

41,201

CIT BK NA

42

3918898

PASADENA, CA

NAT

40,747

40,747

EAST WEST BK

43

197478

PASADENA, CA

SMB

37,120

35,215

BOKF NA

46

339858

TULSA, OK

NAT

32,217

32,217

ZB NA /

ZIONS BC

FROST BK

47

682563

SAN ANTONIO, TX

SMB

31,797

31,797

FIRST NB OF PA

48

379920

GREENVILLE, PA

NAT

31,212

31,212

SYNOVUS BK

49

395238

COLUMBUS, GA

SMB

31,106

31,106

ASSOCIATED BK NA

50

917742

GREEN BAY, WI

NAT

30,422

30,422

STERLING NB

51

125471

MONTEBELLO, NY

NAT

30,342

30,342

BANKUNITED NA

52

3938186

MIAMI LAKES, FL

NAT

30,280

30,280

IBERIABANK

53

808176

LAFAYETTE, LA

SMB

27,824

27,824

WEBSTER BK NA

55

761806

WATERBURY, CT

NAT

26,488

26,488

TEXAS CAP BK NA

58

2618780

DALLAS, TX

NAT

25,055

25,055

COMMERCE BK

60

601050

KANSAS CITY, MO

SMB

24,728

24,728

VALLEY NB

61

229801

PASSAIC, NJ

NAT

23,965

23,965

BNY MELLON NA

62

934329

PITTSBURGH, PA

NAT

23,950

23,950

T D BK USA NA

63

2121196

WILMINGTON, DE

NAT

23,364

23,364

TCF NB

64

266271

SIOUX FALLS, SD

NAT

23,021

22,663

RAYMOND JAMES BK NA

67

2193616

SAINT
PETERSBURG, FL

NAT

21,867

21,759

UMB BK NA

68

936855

KANSAS CITY, MO

NAT

21,558

21,558

WESTERN ALLI BK

71

3138146

PHOENIX, AZ

SMB

20,404

20,404

FIRST NB OF OMAHA

72

527954

OMAHA, NE

NAT

20,351

20,351

MB FNCL BK NA

73

656733

CHICAGO, IL

NAT

20,030

20,017

BANK OF AMER CA NA

74

1443266

SAN FRANCISCO,
CA

NAT

19,804

19,804

CHEMICAL BK

75

542649

MIDLAND, MI

SMB

19,237

19,237

UNITED BK

76

365325

FAIRFAX, VA

SMB

19,042

19,042

FIRSTBANK

77

288853

LAKEWOOD, CO

SMB

17,509

17,509

OLD NB

78

208244

VANSVILLE, IN

NAT

17,423

17,423

BANK OF HAWAII

79

795968

HONOLULU, HI

SMB

17,062

16,525

ARVEST BK

80

311845

FAYETTEVILLE,
AR

SMB

16,759

16,759

WASHINGTON FED NA

82

656377

SEATTLE, WA

NAT

15,585

15,585
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STIFEL B&T

84

3076248

SAINT LOUIS, MO

SMB

15,287

15,287

5.2. Model Specification
In our study, we rely on panel data analysis to investigate the behaviors of sampled
banks across the entire period while clustering by bank ID. Although a model can be specified
in an efficient manner to present reliable explanatory variables that account for the changes in
the dependent variable, some unobserved heterogeneity may still be present and becomes a
part of the error term. Speaking of the banking industry, it is commonly possible that some
large banks follow more sophisticated strategies to increase their profitability as opposed to
other banks that prefer modest methods of generating profits. Several common practices exist
and make the banking industry diversified in terms of conducting operations. Moreover, the
degree of competitiveness between banks varies from locally-based banks to nationally-based
ones and also based on bank size.
Thus, econometricians have resorted to specific techniques to mitigate or completely
dislocate the shared systematic heterogeneity from the error term. With panel data being
utilized in this study, to solve the heterogeneity problem, either a fixed effects (FE) or a random
effects (RE) regression model are the go to solution.
To determine a more consistent model, we run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test check. The
null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that unique errors are uncorrelated with regressors,
assuming a random effects model (Greene, 2008). The Hausman test yields a probability of chisquared of 0.0000, and since that value is less than 0.05; we reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the fixed effects model is more appropriate to be implemented in our study.

In a panel data analysis, the within or fixed effects estimators refer to an estimator for
the coefficients in the regression model including those fixed effects. Those models help
econometricians control for unobserved heterogeneity when the latter is constant over time. The
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classical representation for FE model can be explained through the following linear unobserved
effects model for “N” observations and “T” time periods:

Yit = Xit β + αi + μit

for t=1,......T and i=1,....N

Where:
Yit = Dependent Variable
Xit = Time-variant regressor matrix of all participating explanatory variables
β = the k*1 matrix of parameters
αi = the unobserved time-invariant individual effect
μit = error term

Unlike Xit, αi cannot be directly observed; and contrary to the RE model where the
unobserved αi is independent of Xit (remember that the RE effect assumption is that individual
specific effects are uncorrelated with explanatory variables), the FE model allows αi to be
correlated with the independent variables, i.e. the regressor matrix Xit. Since αi is unobservable,
it cannot be directly controlled for; hence, the FE model eliminated by demeaning the variables
using a within transformation technique and obtaining an FE estimator βhat

fe

by an OLS

regression.
Note that Stata allows a GLS random effect regression while allowing an OLS fixed effect
regression. The difference between OLS and GLS resides in the assumptions made about the
error term of the model (Green, 2008). Hence, we carry out this study using the fixed effects (FE)
regression analysis to investigate the effects of bank-specific capital adequacy ratios, leverage
ratios, and other characteristics on bank operating efficiency.

5.3. Empirical Approach and Definition of Variables:
As mentioned before, the recent crisis highlighted the fragility of the regulatory and
supervisory policies that govern the bank sectors, with major U.S. banks becoming insolvent
and in dire need of rescue through government funding and bailout, such as AIG, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, etc. Thakor (2018)8 finds empirical evidence suggesting that the 2007-2009 crisis
was an insolvency crisis, not a liquidity crisis and it was unavoidable to blame the banks that
were in the eye of the storm from stirring such turmoil in financial markets and launching a

8
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credit crisis through being ill-capitalized. Hence, the importance of capital regulation surfaced
in renewed related discussions; new laws and accords followed shortly after. The Dodd Frank
Act came into law in 2010, followed by adjustments to Basel II in the form of Basel III, of which
the U.S. is a participating member, and which proposed and forced increased capital, leverage,
and liquidity minimums for U.S. banks to abide by.
In the aftermath of the crisis, banks have been thriving, and this leads us to suspect that
recently enacted capital regulatory policies may play a role in improving bank efficiency in the
US. “Banks across the U.S. are now showing signs of well-capitalization, strong credit quality, and
steady growth overall”.9 However, a myriad of previous studies find that capital regulation
impedes bank performance and financial stability by limiting risky investments that banks,
subject to the capital regulation, may embark in. This becomes worthy of investigation.
Besides increasing the core capital requirements, what Basel III brought about is a
stricter focus on a minimum amount of common equity and a minimum liquidity ratio as
potential safeguards.
The accord also includes additional requirements for "systemically important banks,"
(SIBs), or any financial institution that may be dubbed "too big to fail." Basel III was subject to a
gradual implementation that began in January 2013 and that is expected to be completed by
January 1, 2019 (BIS). More specifically, Basel III capital and liquidity framework covers three
areas: capital adequacy requirements, leverage requirements, and liquidity requirements. The
main empirical model of this study looks at the possible impact of regulatory capital
requirements in general through the effect of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on bank
efficiency. As the capital regulatory framework has witnessed drastic changes following the
financial crisis, in terms of increasing minimum requirements and establishing new capital
buffers, it is very helpful to examine more in depth whether these new rules have affected bank
inefficiency in any possible way. Hence, we look at the two categories that make up the core

9

This is according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2018.
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capital, Tier 1 and tier 2 risk-based ratios, in addition to another precautionary tool called CET 1
ratio.
A second possible determinant of bank efficiency is the core capital leverage
requirement, proxied by the core capital leverage ratio (rbclaaj). Under Basel III, total capital is
made of Tier 1 and Tier II capital, so, we break down the impact of capital regulation by looking
at the combined, and afterwards, the individual impact of those two components of total
capital. Finally, as the banking industry is a risky sector, banks and other financial institutions
are exposed to elevated risk exposures that may come in the form of either systemic risk for the
large, more inter-connected banks or credit risk for any bank with lending activities. This study
also examines the impact of credit risk, proxied by the net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr).
For more robustness, we control for some factors that may have an impact on the
relationship between capital adequacy and operating efficiency for banks. The first control
group is a vector of bank-level characteristics that captures bank-portfolio characteristics such
as bank size and return on assets. In addition, we control for the macro-economic environment
commonly

used

in

banking

industry-related

literature;

those

macro-economic

environment controls are GDP and inflation rate. More details on all the above variables will
follow shortly.
We propose the following empirical model:

eeffr,t = β0 + β1 CARi,t + β2 rbc1waj i,t + β3 T2capratio i,t + β4 Bank-Control + β5 Macroeconomic

(1)

Environment + μit
Where:
eeffr =

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠−𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

The literature broadly defines bank operating efficiency as the ratio of operating
expenses to operating income. Ayadi et al. (2016) describe bank operating efficiency as the
interval between an actual production process and the optimal practice or standard. In this
study, we hope that bank operating efficiency captures the performance of commercial banks
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and measures their ability to use their assets to generate income, i.e. how well input can be costeffectively utilized to create output.
While the Fed establishes capital requirements in the form of well-capitalized standards
for the consolidated financial holding companies (BHCs), the OCC establishes similar minimum
capital requirements and standards for banks under the BHCs’ umbrella, and under Basel III,
minimum capital ratios are established in addition to general capital adequacy standards for
large and internationally-active U.S. BHCs and commercial banks.
Pradhan et al. (2017) define bank operating efficiency as a bank’s ability to produce
output while reducing its related expenditure without compromising the quality of production.
Interestingly, while the banking performance literature has agreed on bank operating efficiency
ratio as a proxy for bank operating efficiency, it has not completely agreed on a uniform
definition of that ratio, or on its interpretation in the process. While total operating income to
total operating expense ratio is the proxy for a bank’s operational efficiency (Pradhan et al., 2017
and Odunga, 2013), prior literature defines the operating efficiency as the operating expenses
over operating income (Lotto, 2018). In line with the former view, Hassan (2002) concludes that
the ability of a bank to effectively manage its operating expenses is reflected in a high
operational efficiency ratio; which is likely to have a positive impact on profitability; a view that
treats a higher efficiency ratio as a favorable sign of a better performance and increased
profitability. However, in the banking industry, an efficiency ratio of 50% is considered the
maximum optimal efficiency ratio and the literature shows that a lower efficiency ratio indicates
a bank’s good performance and profitability. As a result, this study employs the latter view, i.e.
bank operating efficiency as a ratio of operating expenses to operating income.

CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio) =

𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙+𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

Following Gul et al., (2011) and Lotto (2006), we measure the capital adequacy ratio
(CAR) as the ratio of total bank capital to the assets, and we specifically use risk-weighted
assets, defined as the bank’s off balance sheet exposure weighted according to its risk profile,
since this type of asset calculation is used in determining the capital requirements or capital
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adequacy ratio (CAR) for a financial institution. In fact, in the U.S., the overall bank capital
requirement is partially based on the weighted risk of a bank’s assets, obtained by multiplying
on and off-balance sheet item by risk weights that range from zero to 200% (FDIC). According
to Lotto (2006), capital adequacy is a measure of the financial strength and sustainability of
bank capital in the face of adverse economic and financial circumstances. Under Basel III, the
regulatory or risk-based capital is divided into three categories, Tier I capital, Tier 2 capital, and
Common equity Tier 1 capital. All of these categories make up the total capital, which is defined
as the sum of Tier I capital and Tier II capital. By measuring the level of capital adequacy, CAR
also captures the bank’s risk of insolvency from excessive losses.
Under Basel II, the original Risk-Based Capital ratio was 8%; after Basel III went into
effect, it added a +2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), which is applicable to all banks in
the U.S., bringing the regulatory total capital requirement to 10.5% 10

𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙

rbc1waj (Tier 1Capital Ratio) = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
As disclosed on J.P. Morgan Chase & Co’s 2017 Annual Report, Tier I risk-based capital
is the main component of a bank’s total capital and it comprises common stockholder’s equity
plus additional Tier 1 capital made of perpetual preferred stock.
Under Basel II, Tier I risk-based capital was at 4%. With the enactment of Basel III, it
went up by +2% as a minimum increase, then by +2.5% as a Capital Conservation Buffer (a total
of +4.5% increase), reaching 8.5% Tier 1 capital requirements.

𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙

T2CR (Tier 1 Supplementary Capital Ratio) = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
Tier 2 risk-based capital is the secondary element that make up total bank capital under
Basel III and it consists of long-term debt qualifying as Tier 2, in addition to qualifying
allowance for credit losses, revaluation reserves, and hybrid debt. Similar to Tier 1 capital ratio,
10

This is according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2018.
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it is calculated based on the weighted risk of a bank’s assets; however, the calculation of Tier 2
capital itself proves to be more complicated since it is composed of less-liquid assets. Equally
important is to mention that Tier 2 capital is composed of two levels. Upper-level Tier 2 capital
is perpetual and superior to preferred capital and equity, while the Lower-lave Tier 2 capital is
inexpensive for a bank to issue.

Bank-Control = a vector capturing bank portfolio characteristics and includes bank assets as a
proxy for bank size and returns on assets that captures bank profitability.

Asset = Total Assets
According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), the literature documents differences by bank
size in terms of portfolio composition (e.g., Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Berger, Miller,
Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005). We follow prior empirical studies in considering total assets as
a proxy for bank size. Also, a plethora of empirical studies both in accounting and finance,
(Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Daley, 1984; and Foster, 1977) have also relied on total assets as a
proxy for the firm size.

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

ROA (Return on Assets) = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
The second bank characteristic we control for is return on assets (roa), which is a
profitability ratio that captures how efficient a bank’s management is in generating earnings
from their assets.
According to the literature, a high ROA indicates solid operating performance, and that
the bank is more efficient at generating profits.
Macroeconomic Environment= a vector of country-level control variables including gross
domestic product in the U.S. as a proxy for economic growth in addition to the inflation rate in
the U.S. to capture general financial conditions.
LGDP= the natural log of the real gross domestic product.
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Economists rely on real GDP as a macroeconomic tool of monitoring the growth of
output in an economy, as it is concerned with the total value produced using constant prices,
thus isolating the effect of price change or inflation. As such, real GDP has been commonly
utilized to gauge changes in the level of output of an economy. We have chosen to take the
natural logarithm of GDP to reduce the impact of outliers in the data.
INF= Inflation rate.
The inflation rate (INF) is a measurement of inflation and conveys the change in prices
level over a period of time. Our study benefits from the use of inflation rate as a measure of
capturing a country’s general financial conditions and surroundings.
μ= The error term.
Among the worries that policy makers lose sleep over is the issue of bank insolvency.
History shows a ripple effect from bank insolvency to the financial system as a whole, and as
mentioned before, the collapse of major banks and money centers in the US was the catalyst of a
fierce, steep 2007-2009 global financial crisis.
Lotto (2018) defines capital adequacy as an essential tool in safeguarding a bank’s
solvency and maintain its profitability, since conducting banking activities is redeemed one of
the riskiest practices in the financial market by far. Under Basel III, total capital is defined as the
sum of Tier I capital and Tier II capital. In addition, Basel III introduces two additional capital
buffers: the mandatory Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB) applicable to all banks in the U.S.
and the discretionary Counter-cyclical Capital Buffer (CcyB) applicable to Advanced
Approached Banks.
The relevance of capital adequacy in the banking system may be inherited to the
existence of prospective information asymmetries between bank management and borrowers,
which in the case of default, causes banks to sustain considerable losses, and what better
measure to be prepared for such scenario other than having adequate capital in place (Lotto,
2018). It is argued that the main focus of bank supervisory policies should be on boosting the

27

capabilities of private investors to surmount information barriers and improve existing bank
monitoring and governance efforts (Beck et al., 2006). When certain government policies or costs
in the form of information or transactions costs obstruct the capabilities of private agents to
exercise effecting monitoring on banks, a powerful official supervision of banks can ameliorate
their corporate governance (Stigler, 1971); a view that is known as the Supervisory power view.

Additional Explanatory Variables:

RBCET1=

𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

The Common Equity Tier I Risk-Based Capital ratio (RBCET1) is a part of Tier 1 riskbased capital and it comprises common stockholder’s equity. Under Basel III, CET1 was at 2%;
the Minimum Increase of Basel III brought about +2.5% minimum increase, in addition to a
similar +2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), bringing the CET1 ratio for all U.S. banks to
7%.
CET1 is one of the main measures of bank solvency that gauges a bank’s capital strength
by measuring the bank’s common equity capital against its assets. Note that all capital ratio
formulas (CAR, Tier 1 capital ratio, Tier 2 capital ratio, and Common Equity Tier 1 ratio) share
the same denominator, i.e. they are all expressed as a percentage of the risk-based or riskweighted assets. Since not all assets share the exact same risk, the assets acquired by the bank
are then weighted based on the credit risk and the market risk for each asset present. So:
eeffr,t = β0 + β1 RBCET1CER i,t + β2 Bank-Contro + β3 Macroeconomic Environment +

μit (2)

𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙

rbclaaj (Core Capital Leverage ratio) = 𝑂𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓−𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒

(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)

The core capital non-risk-based leverage ratio (rbclaaj) can be calculated as the ratio of
Tier I capital to the bank’s total exposure, i.e. its average total consolidated assets. Under Basel
III, U.S. banks are expected to maintain a leverage ratio in excess of 4%, which is a minimum
requirement that all U.S. commercial banks need to comply with. In July 2013, the Fed
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announced a special treatment for certain systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs);
the minimum Basel III leverage ratio for 8 SIFIs is 6% for the banks and 5% for their insured
BHCs. So:
eeffr,t = β0 + β2 rbclaaj i,t + β3 Bank-Control +

β4 Macroeconomic Environment + μit (3)

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒−𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠

ntlnlsr = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠

A net charge-off is the dollar amount that represents the difference between gross
charge-offs and what was subsequently recovered of outstanding delinquent debt. The Federal
Reserve defines the net charge-offs to loans and leases ratio as net charge-offs expressed as a
percentage of loans and leases. This ratio proxies for credit risk and its fluctuations say a thing
or two about the well-being of the economy and financial system altogether. During the third
quarter of 2017, the ratio was reported at 0.44% in the U.S. compared to a staggering 3.14%
during the fourth quarter of 2009. According to FDIC, net charge-offs are the total loans and
leases removed from the balance sheet due to being uncollected less amounts recovered on
loans and leases previously charged off. We use this ratio as a proxy for credit risk due to its
similarity to what prior literature has heavily relied on as a proxy for credit risk, the NPL, or
non-performing loans ratio. A bad loan becomes dubbed as non-performing loan when the
debtor has not made the scheduled payments for a period of at least 90 days for commercial
banking. So:
eeffr,t = β0 + β1 ntlnlsr i,t + β2 Bank-Control + β3 Macroeconomic Environment +

nimy (Net Interest margin) =

μit (4)

𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛−𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

The net interest margin is a margin rate commonly used as a financial indicator in
efficiency analysis (Wozniweska, 2008). It measures the degree to which a bank is successful at
investing its funds compared to its expenses on the same investments. While a negative value of
net interest margin is an alarming sign that the bank has strayed away from optimal investment
decisions since interest expenses exceed the investments-generated returns, a positive (nimy)
indicates that a bank has invested its funds efficiently. So:
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eeffr,t = β0 + β1 nimy i,t + β2 Bank-Control +

6.

β3 Macroeconomic Environment

+

μit (5)

Hypotheses Development:

The attention that regulatory authorities such as the Federal Reserve or the Basel Committee
relate to specific banking regulations such as obligatory minimum requirements for capital,
leverage or liquidity, may be a possible indicator of the relevance of such regulatory policies in
the regulators’ view to steer banks towards a safe operating environment. Hence, we
hypothesize that higher capital requirements, whether at the core capital level or at certain subcomponents level (such as Tier I and the common equity Tier 1 capital) for U.S. commercial
increase their operating efficiency, and this effect is more highlighted in the period following
the financial crisis (2007-2009), leading us to conclude that regulatory compliance with the
newly advanced requirements has indeed improved the overall financial system. Therefore, we
expect a positive correlation to exist and we want to establish that large U.S. commercial banks
are economically efficient as a result of complying with recent financial regulation enacted in
the aftermath of the financial crisis.
On Capital Requirements:
Thakor (2018) finds empirical evidence of a positive correlation between higher levels of
capital and bank insolvency since his findings suggest that banks with higher capital ratios were
reported to be less affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Berger & Bouwman (2013) conclude
that performance of medium and large banks is enhanced by capital, especially during times of
banking crises; they also conclude that capital always enhances market shares of small banks as
well as the chances of overcoming financial crises and emerging strong from those crises. We
conjecture that increasing or strengthening regulatory requirements on capital adequacy, as
measured by the capital adequacy ratio, Tier 1 capital ratio, and Tier 2 capital ratio, increases
bank operating efficiency. Thus:
Hypothesis 1: Capital adequacy requirements positively and significantly impact bank
operating efficiency.
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Due to the importance the regulators attach to common equity Tier 1 capital, and the
recent drastic minimum requirements hike from 2% to 7% under Basel III, we examine its
isolated role on bank operating efficiency. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: Higher CET1 capital requirements have a positive and significant impact on bank
operating efficiency.
On Leverage Requirements:
Under Basel III, the leverage ratio also received a special treatment where all U.S.
commercial banks are expected to maintain 4% or higher. Overall, the capital adequacy
literature is more focused on the total capital requirements and its immediate subdivisions.
Little has been done to decipher the effect of leverage requirement. With that being said:
Hypothesis 3: Higher leverage requirements positively impact U.S. commercial banks and
savings institutions’ operating efficiency.
On Credit Risk Exposure:
Credit risk for banks stems from the probability of losses as a result of borrowers failing
to honor their borrowing agreements and not paying back their loans in full or on time. The net
charge-off to loans and leases ratio (ntlnlsr) is an appropriate tool to gauge how risky the
lending activities of a bank actually are. As a low net charge-off ratio is associated with the bank
having less bad debt and less charge-offs, and thus a better performance, we expect an inverse
relationship between operating efficiency and the net charge-offs ratio.
Hypothesis 4: the higher the net charge-off ratio, the lower the operating efficiency of U.S.
commercial banks.
Finally, when the net interest margin (nimy) is expressed as a negative value, it is
indicative of the bank failing to make an optimal investment decision and this may be due to
interest expenses exceeding returns generated by investments. On the other hand, a positive
(nimy) is an indication of efficient investment of funds by the entity. So:
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Hypothesis 5: Net interest margin for U.S. commercial banks is positively related to operating
efficiency.
Based on the regression results of Hypothesis 1, we further expand on that idea by
looking at the individual impact of Tier II capital ratio on efficiency while controlling for the
same bank-level characteristics and macroeconomic environment characteristics. Due to the
supplementary nature of Tier 2 capital, it is not subject to minimum requirements under Basel
III or any other authority, we expect it to have either a very minimal effect or no effect at all on
operational efficiency; thus:
Hypothesis 6: Higher Tier II capital requirements have little to zero impact on bank operating
efficiency.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, a movement of enacting new financial
regulations and/or improving the existing ones was gaining momentum. Regulators viewed
stricter capital and leverage requirements under Basel III and the guidelines passed through the
Dodd Frank Reform as necessary in reshaping the then-ill financial system and establishing and
enforcing solid grounds for financial stability; thus assisting banks in regaining strength and
consumer trust. Based on this view:
Hypothesis 7: Increased capital and leverage requirements in the aftermath of the financial crisis
improve the operating efficiency of U.S. commercial banks.

7.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2: Summary Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables utilized to run this study. On average, large U.S. commercial banks,
with $15 billion or more in consolidated assets have an operating efficiency of 59.31%, as measured by the ratio of bank
operating expenses to its operating income (same as ratio of bank expenses to its revenues). The minimum operating efficiency
for the sampled banks is 43% and it was reported by Goldman Sachs Bank in 2008; and the only other negative value of the
operating efficiency ratio in the sample was reported by Morgan Stanley in the same year. The maximum operating efficiency
reported is 74% and also reported by Morgan Stanley Private Bank in 2008. These statistics speak directly to the trouble large
banks in the U.S. were facing in the wake of the crisis in 2008; as a result of their involvement in securitization during the
subprime mortgage crisis, both GSB and MS, the last two major investment banks in the U.S. suffered during the financial crisis
and enticed help from the Federal government. On September 2008, they received a massive bailout from the U.S. Department of
Treasury as part of TARP. More summary statistics results are shown in the main document.

Variable
Operating

Obs
1,162

Mean
.593174
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Std. Dev.

Min

Max

.098151

.4314

.74

Efficiency ratio
Capital
Adequacy ratio

Tier 1 Capital
ratio
Tier 2 Capital
ratio
Common
Equity
Capital ratio
Leverage ratio
Net ChargeOff ratio
Net Interest
Margin
Assets
ROA
LGDP
INF

1,162

.1123568

.0775716

.0402627

.9489034

1,162

.1140532

.0201946

.0898

.1431

1,162

.0204015

.01116

.0073977

.0402361

268

.1015179

.0499856

0

.1617

1,162

.0966151

.0685607

.0518

.9495

1,162

.0052543

.0055198

.0001

.0174

1,162

.0349705

.0156842

-.005

.1423

1,162
1,162
1,162
1,162

5.77e+07
.0104044
9.58054
2.106145

6.58e+07
.0044482
.1915247
.4553519

3781333
.0032
9.235262
1.14

2.06e+08
.0176
9.87742
2.74

The standard deviations of eeffr, CAR, rbc1rwaj, T2CR, RBCET1CER, rnc1aaj, ntlnlsr, nimy, and roa are all inferior to 0.1,
indicating that Tier 1, Tier 2, CET1 capital raios, leverage ratio, profitability, and credit risk are relatively heterogenous among
the sample, while the standard deviation of assets, LGDP, and INF indicate that the banks in the sample have different sizes,
different (economic growth?? For LGDP) and are subject to different macroeconomic conditions.

This section presents the summary statistics of the variables utilized to run this study as
shown in Table 2. On average, large U.S. commercial banks, with $15 billion or more in
consolidated assets have an operating efficiency of 59.31%, as measured by the ratio of bank
operating expenses to its operating income. The minimum operating efficiency for the sampled
banks is 43% and it was reported by Goldman Sachs Bank in 2008; and the only other negative
value of the operating efficiency ratio in the sample was reported by Morgan Stanley within the
same year. The maximum operating efficiency reported is 74% and is also reported by Morgan
Stanley Private Bank in 2008. These statistics speak directly to the trouble large banks in the U.S.
were facing in the wake of the crisis in 2008; as a result of their involvement in securitization
during the subprime mortgage crisis, both GSB and MS, the last two major investment banks in
the U.S. suffered during the financial crisis and enticed help from the Federal government. On
September 2008, they received a massive bailout from the U.S. Department of Treasury as part
of TARP.
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As a general rule of thumb, 50% efficiency ratio is the maximum optimal efficiency ratio
and thus, banks strive for lower efficiency ratios as they are indicative of the bank profitability.
The efficiency ratio also indicates that the bank is earning more than what it is spending. So,
having an average of 58.16% operating efficiency ratio speaks volumes to how large U.S.
commercial banks are technically efficient. That is, on average, the operating expense of any
bank in our sample comprises 59.31% of its operating income.
Now that our preliminary descriptive statistics have told us a thing or two about current
efficiency situation of our sample, let’s shift gears towards bank capital. The descriptive
statistics also reveal that, on average, large U.S. commercial banks hold a capital adequacy ratio
of 11.23%, which is well above the 10.5% level established by Basel III. The maximum level of
capital adequacy reported in Table 2 is 94.89% as reported by Bank of America California in
2002, while the lowest capital adequacy is recorded at 4.02% by Texas Capital bank in 2012.
Interestingly, not all large U.S. commercial banks in our sample comply with the Basel III
capital requirement of a minimum total capital ratio of 10.5%.
Now, looking at the capital requirements in more depth, under Basel III, the three
categories of risk-based capital are Common Equity Tier I (CET1) capital and Additional Tier I
capital; whose sum yields the Tier I capital, and finally the Tier II capital.
Table 2 shows that banks in our sample maintain 11.40% Tier I core risk-based capital
ratio (rbc1rwaj) on average; with a maximum of 14.31% and a minimum of 8.98%. The
minimum requirement on (T1CR) increased from 4% under Basel II to 6% under Basel III, in
addition to a mandatory 2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB).
As far as the Tier II risk-based capital (T2CR) is concerned, banks maintain an average of
2.04% with a maximum of 4.02% and a minimum of 0.73%. Tier 2 capital is of a minimal
relevance in comparison to Tier 1 capital, since it only serves as a supplementary capital while
the latter is more secure and is used to absorb shocks or operational losses the bank may come
face to face with.
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Original Basel III rules from 2014 requires banks to fund their activities with 4.5% of
common equity of risk-weighted assets, up from only 2% in Basel II, thus more than doubling
this specific requirement. Table 2 shows that sampled banks maintain on average, a 10.15%
Common Equity Tier I capital requirement, although not all bank comply with this rule, as a
minimum of 0% is reported; and finally, 16.17% is the maximum CET1 capital requirement
reported. Because banks were not required to start complying with CET1 until 2014, we only
have data on CET1 from 2014 and up. CET1 is another capital measure that serves as a
precautionary tool in protecting not only banks from failure, but also the economy from another
financial crisis. The 0% reported as a minimum in Table 3 above can be explained away by the
fact that banks are not expected to fully comply with the CET1 requirement until 2019 when the
requirement will take full effect, and many of them are in route to 100% compliance.
Large U.S. commercial banks on average, maintain 9.66% core capital leverage ratio
(rbc1aaj), which is well above with what is expected of banks to maintain under Basel III. Basel
III requires U.S. banks to maintain 4% and thus, our sampled banks fully comply with this
specific leverage ratio requirement. The minimum core capital leverage ratio according to table
3 is 5.18% while the maximum is 94.95%.
The mean net charge-offs to loans and leases ratio (ntlnlsr) sits at a very low 0.52% with
a maximum of 1.74% and a minimum of 0.01%. Looking at the historical values of this ratio,
especially during the financial crisis, this is a good indication that commercial banks in the U.S.
have reemerged stronger from the crisis as far as charge-offs and delinquent debt is concerned.
A lower (ntlnlsr) is associated with less charged-off debt and increased debt management. As
mentioned earlier, (ntlnlsr) went down from 3.14% in the fourth quarter of 2009 to 0.44% in the
third quarter of 2017.
Regarding the net interest margin ratio (nimy), it is between -0.5% and 14.23%,
averaging 3.49%. The negative minimum net interest margin value is indicative of banks not
making their optimal investment decisions, since interest expenses far exceed returns generated
by investments. On the other hand, the positive value of (nimy) indicates that the bank has
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invested its funds efficiently. The mean of 3.49% indicated that on average, U.S. commercial
banks have a positive net interest margin and are investing their funds efficiently.
As far as our control variables are concerned, the return on assets (roa) ratio of large US
commercial banks is between a minimum of -0.0605 and a maximum of 83.41%, averaging
1.50%. Return on assets is a common profitability indicator; for banks, a higher (roa) indicates
more asset efficiency. According the St. Louis Federal Reserve, data on U.S. bank ROAs since
1984 show an ROA rate hovering around or just above 1%.
Finally, (asset) proxies for bank size in this study with a mean of $1.18 trillion; GDP
averages $14.7425 trillion and this study employs its natural logarithm while inflation, reported
in percentage points, averages 2.09% with a minimum inflation rate of 0.11% reported in 2008
and a maximum of 3.73% reported in 2001 over the sampling period of 2000-2017.
8.

Results and Interpretation
Given the immense importance of bank solvency within any economy, bank capital

regulation has been regarded as a major tool in not only supervising bank operations, but also
guaranteeing that banks abide by the general safety rules that lead to a sound banking system.
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regressions using fixed effects
estimators with robust standard errors, clustered by Bank ID as a measure of controlling for
heteroskedasticity or correlation between the observations of the same bank across the years in
the sample. As we know, even with fixed effects, there could a chance that the coefficients we
are getting may possibly be affected by heteroskedasticity or correlation.
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Capital Adequacy)
Table 3 represents results of the fixed effects regression. The relationship between bank operating efficiency and capital
requirements is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. We find that bank regulation in the U.S. in the form of
regulatory capital requirements is positively related with large commercial banks’ operating efficiency. Holding all other things
equal, operating efficiency increases by 16.43% for every one unit increase in capital requirements. This is in sync with Thakor
(1996) findings that increased regulation on capital requirements influence a bank’s decision to alter their internal operating
strategy on a multitude of levels, as well as with Berger & Bouwman (2013) who find that capital enhances the performance of
medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Table 4 also shows that 60.40% of the variance is due to differences
across panels and a coefficient of determination of 34.08%. More summary statistics results are shown in the main document.

CAR

Operating Efficiency Ratio
0.16a
(2.65)
36

Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Tier 2 Capital Ratio
Total Assets
ROA
GDP
INF
Adj R2
Observations

-0.38a
(-2.95)
-0.98b
(-2.31)
-3.68e-11b
(-2.21)
-10.10 a
(-9.17)
0.13a
(4.19)
0.12a
(12.3)
34%
1,162

(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%

On Capital Adequacy:
Table 3 represents results of the fixed effects regression. The relationship between bank
operating efficiency and capital requirements is statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. We find that bank regulation in the U.S. in the form of regulatory capital requirements is
positively related with large commercial banks’ operating efficiency. Holding all other things
equal, operating efficiency increases by 16.43% for each one unit increase in capital
requirements. This is in sync with Thakor (1996) findings that increasing regulatory capital
requirements impacts a bank’s decision to adjust their internal operating strategy accordingly
and on a multitude of levels, as well as with Berger & Bouwman (2013) who find bank
performance, especially medium and large ones, to be possibly improved during banking crises.
Table 3 also shows that 60.40% of the variance is due to differences across panels and a
coefficient of determination of 34.08% bolsters our results.
On Tier 1 Capital:
Next, we go more in depth to decipher the total capital ratio into its sub-components to
allow for a thorough examination of the individual effect of each sub-category on bank
operating performance. Table 3 shows that the coefficient of Tier 1 core risk-based capital is
statistically significant at the 1% significance level; however, it is negatively correlated with
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bank performance. One possible explanation for this inverse relationship is that rigid capital
regulation may fire back and cause bank efficiency to deteriorate because it limits opportunities
for banks to tackle risky projects or imposes constraints on lending activities for fear of potential
default. Similar to one partial result by Barth et al. (2010), who conclude that placing tough
control and tight restrictions on the activities of bank may be adversely associated with bank
efficiency, we conclude that Tier I capital ratio that was increased under Basel III from 4% to a
minimum requirement of 6% plus another Capital Conservation Buffer of 2% to reach a total of
8.5% may be too rigid for large bank to the point that it has a negative impact on operating
efficiency.
However, since Tier I capital is composed of CET1 capital that is subject to regulatory
requirements of its own, plus additional Tier I capital, it may be beneficial to look at the
separated impact of CET1 on operating efficiency as we hypothesized previously.
On Tier 2 Capital:
Table 3 shows that Tier 2 capital ratio is negatively and statistically significant at the 1%
significance level. This inverse relationship between operating efficiency and Tier 2 capital ratio
may be explained in a different context than the above one. As mentioned before, Tier 2 capital
is considered less reliable than Tier 1 capital due to the difficulty of its calculation as well as its
asset composition, and contrary to what we expected in Hypothesis 1, i.e. that Tier 2 capital
ratio, among other ratios of capital adequacy, increases bank operating efficiency, an inverse
relationship exists. We then conjecture in Hypothesis 6 that due to the supplementary nature of
Tier 2 capital, its impact may be minimal and very limited and we run an isolated FE regression
on Tier 2 capital ratio (T2CR).
Table 4: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Tier 2 Capital)
Table 4 confirms the inverse relationship between Tier 2 capital and operating efficiency, showing that it the higher the Tier 2
capital ratios, the lower the operating efficiency of a bank. We conclude this negative correlation may be due to the
supplementary nature of Tier 2 capital.

Tier 2 Capital Ratio
Total Assets

Operating Efficiency Ratio
-0.82b
(-1.99)
3.46e-11b
38

(-2.09)
-9.94a
(-9.03)
0.14a
(4.66)
0.12a
(15.13)
33%
1,162

ROA
GDP
INF
Adj R2
Observations

(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%

To our expectations this time, empirical findings confirm the inverse relationship,
showing that the higher the Tier 2 capital ratios, the lower the operating efficiency of a bank.
On Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (RBCET1):
According to the capital and liquidity rules under Basel III, all banks must comply with
a minimum CET1 capital ratio of 4.5% by 2019 plus an additional 2.5% in CCB, bringing the
CET1 requirement to 7%. As such, CET1 is deemed one of the pillars of total capital of a bank
since it captures bank solvency that perfectly gauges a bank’s capital strength.

Table 5: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Common Equity Tier 1 Capital)
Table 5 shows that the common equity requirements in the form of Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) positively impact the
operating efficiency of large commercial banks. Holding all other things equal, operating efficiency increases by 7.52% for every
one unit increase in CET1 requirements. Linking the positive impact of CET1 on bank efficiency to the negative impact of Tier 1
capital, of whom CET1 is a component, may be perplexing. One may wonder if these contradicting effects are born out of Tier 1
capital having two different components (CET1 and Additional Tier 1 capital), and that the negative effect of the Additional Tier
1 capital dominates the positive effect of CET1.Table 6 also shows that the coefficient of common equity Tier 1 capital ratio is
positively and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. All other things equal, a one unit increase in CET1
requirements leads to a 7.52% increase in a bank’s operational efficiency. It also shows that 30.04% of the variation in bank
operating efficiency can be explained by CET1 ratio.

Operating Efficiency Ratio
0.08a
(5.06)
4.76e-11
(0.33)
-5.58a
(-3.50)
-0.26b
(-2.28)
-0.02
(-0.44)

Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio
Total Assets
ROA
GDP
INF
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Adj R2
Observations
(a)

31%
268

Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%

Based on Table 5, the common equity requirements in the form of Common Equity Tier
1 capital (CET1) positively impacts the operating efficiency of large commercial banks. Holding
all other things equal, operating efficiency increases by 7.52% for each one unit increase in CET1
requirements. Linking the positive impact of CET1 on bank efficiency to the negative impact of
Tier 1 capital, of whom CET1 is a component, may be perplexing. One may wonder if these
contradicting effects are born out of Tier 1 capital having two different unequally-important
components (CET1 and Additional Tier 1 capital), and that the negative effect of the Additional
Tier 1 capital dominates the positive effect of CET1.
Table 5 shows that the coefficient of common equity Tier 1 capital ratio is positively and
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. All other things equal, a one unit increase in
CET1 requirements leads to a 7.52% increase in a bank’s operational efficiency. It also shows
that 30.04% of the variation in bank operating efficiency can be explained by CET1 ratio.
On Tier 1 Leverage:
Under Basel III, leverage ratio (rbc1aaj) is a non-risk-based ratio that U.S. commercial
banks are expected to maintain equal to or higher than 4%. According to the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), the leverage ratio is a measure that is intended to strengthen the
risk-based capital requirements.
Table 6: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Tier 1 Leverage)
Table 6 shows that leverage requirements positively and significantly impact bank operating efficiency. All other things equal,
for each unit increase in leverage ratio, operating efficiency increases by 77.49%. We conclude that there is a colossal effect of
Tier 1 leverage requirements on the operating efficiency of banks.

Operating Efficiency Ratio
0.77a
(2.80)
-3.25e-11c
(-1.91)
-10.14a
(-9.36)

Leverage Ratio
Total Assets
ROA
40

0.12a
(3.14)
0.11a
(9.61)
34%
1,162

GDP
INF
Adj R2
Observations
(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%

So, based on Table 6, leverage requirements positively and significantly impact bank
operating efficiency. All other things equal, for each unit increase in leverage ratio, operating
efficiency increases by 77.49%. We conclude that there is a colossal effect of Tier 1 leverage
requirements on the operating efficiency of banks.
On Credit Risk:
As far as the relationship between bank operating efficiency and credit risk, as proxied
by net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr), Table 7 indicates that its coefficient is a statistically
significant one at the 1% level of significance, and that a negative or inverse correlation exists
between bank efficiency and credit risk. As such, any increase in net charge-offs leads to a
diminished bank operating efficiency. This finding corroborates Lotto (2018) who also detects
an inverse relationship between bank efficiency and non-performing loans as their proxy for
credit risk and describes it as “a major finding”.
Table 7: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Net Charge Offs)
Table 7 indicates that the coefficient of credit risk, as proxied by net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr), is a statistically
significant one at the 1% level of significance, and that a negative or inverse correlation exists between bank efficiency and credit
risk. As such, any increase in net charge-offs leads to a diminished bank operating efficiency. This finding corroborates Lotto
(2018) who also detects an inverse relationship between bank efficiency and non-performing loans as their proxy for credit risk
and describes it as “a major finding”.

Operating Efficiency Ratio
-1.99b
(-2.27)
-2.80e-11c
(-1.67)
-10.55a
(-8.72)
0.14a
(4.57)

Net Charge-Off Ratio
Total Assets
ROA
GDP
41

0.12a
(12.50)
34%
1,152

INF
Adj R2
Observations
(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%

On Net Interest Margin:
Net Interest Margin (nimy) is not a part of the financial regulation requirements ratios.
However, we made the choice to look at its impact on bank operation efficiency for two reasons.
First, it is analogous to operating margin for an industrial company and fits right within our
analysis, and second, it is considered one of the main indicators of financial performance and is
heavily used in financial analysis. Following Wozniewska (2008), we believe that (nimy) is one
of the most important bank performance and efficiency indicators and analyzing its dynamics
allows us to check whether the efficiency improves or deteriorates within a given period of
time.

Table 8: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Net Interest Margin)
Table 8 shows that the coefficient of Net Interest Margin is statistically significant at the 1% significance level; and that a
negative correlation exists between (nimy) and bank operating efficiency. To our surprise, we find a negative and statistically
significant relationship between (nimy) and operating efficiency, i.e. an increase in (nimy) decreases operating efficiency. More
explanation is found in the main document.

Operating Efficiency Ratio
-1.45a
(-2.66)
-1.74e-11c
(-0.08)
-9.784a
(-7.16)
0.0047c
(0.15)
0.017a
(2.57)
14%
1,162

Net Interest Margin
Total Assets
ROA
GDP
INF
Adj R2
Observations

(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%
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Results show that the coefficient of Net Interest Margin is statistically significant at the
1% significance level; and that a negative correlation exists between (nimy) and bank operating
efficiency. To our surprise, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between
(nimy) and operating efficiency, i.e. an increase in (nimy) decreases operating efficiency.
On Before and After-Crisis Impact:
Table 9: Fixed Effects Regression Results: Before and After the Crisis Analysis
Table 9 shows results a positive and significant correlation between the efficiency of U.S. commercial banks and financial
regulation in the wake of the financial crisis. All in all, holding other things equal, bank operating efficiency in the U.S. increases
by 16.80% for each one unit increase in financial regulation post crisis. Interestingly, results indicate that financial regulation precrisis is negatively and significantly correlated with bank operating efficiency; with a decline in operating bank efficiency of
about 7.52% for each additional one unit increase in financial regulation pre-crisis; which may be explained by the fact that
capital and leverage requirements pre-crisis were not sufficient to guarantee safe banking operations and caused the operating
efficiency to deteriorate.

CAR
Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Tier 2 Capital Ratio
Before Crisis
After Crisis
Total Assets
ROA
GDP
INF
Adj R2
Observations

Operating Efficiency Ratio
0.16a
(2.65)
-0.38a
(-2.95)
-0.98b
(-2.31)
-0.0752704b
(-1.96)
0.1680941a
(5.21)
-3.68e-11b
(-2.21)
-10.10 a
(-9.17)
0.13a
(4.19)
0.12a
(12.3)
33.23%
1,162

(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10%

To capture the possible impact of increased capital and leverage requirements on U.S.
commercial banks in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, we compare the effect of
financial regulation on bank efficiency prior to and post crisis. We assign a dummy variable to
account for the “Before Crisis” period, taking the value of 1 for years 2000 through 2006 and
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zero otherwise. We also assign a “After Crisis” dummy variable to account for the post-crisis
era, taking the value of 1 for years 2010 through 2017 and zero otherwise.
Confirming our hypothesis 7, Table 9 results detect a positive and significant correlation
between the efficiency of U.S. commercial banks and financial regulation in the wake of the
financial crisis. All in all, holding all other things equal, bank operating efficiency in the U.S.
increases by 16.80% for each one unit increase in financial regulation post crisis. Interestingly,
results indicate that financial regulation pre-crisis is negatively and significantly correlated with
bank operating efficiency, with a decline in operating bank efficiency of about 7.52% for each
additional one unit increase in financial regulation pre-crisis; which may be explained by the
fact that capital and leverage requirements pre-crisis were not sufficient to guarantee safe
banking operations and caused the operating efficiency to deteriorate.
9.

Findings
Our goal is to examine the multi-faceted impact of financial regulation on the operating

efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks. In Table 3, we regress the operational efficiency on
the capital adequacy ratio and the two major components of total capital, Tier 1 capital ratio
(rbc1rwaj) and Tier 2 capital ratio (T2CR) while controlling for bank characteristics and
macroeconomic environment characteristics. We find the capital adequacy coefficient to be
statistically significant and positive, indicating that increased regulation improves a bank’s
operational efficiency and confirming Hypothesis 1. Our results are similar to Thakor (1996)
who claims that imposing tight controls on banks in the form of elevated capital requirements
influences a bank’s decision to alter their internal operating strategy on a multitude of levels, as
well as with Berger & Bouwman (2013) who conclude a positive correlation between capital and
bank performance.
The negative sign of the coefficient of Tier 1 capital ratio is unexpected due to the
relevance of Tier 1 capital in sustaining bank losses. We provide a possible explanation saying
that stringent capital regulation may sometimes counter-attack a bank’s efficiency, causing it to
deteriorate as it limits opportunities for high-risk, high-return investments, or by imposing
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constraints on its lending practices. Similarly, Barth et al. (2010) conclude that restricting bank
activities leads to lower levels of bank efficiency. We then conclude that Tier I capital ratio that
received a special attention under Basel III, through more than doubling it from 4% to 8.5% may
be too rigid for large bank, especially in the light of the fierce resistance of banks to increasing
capital requirements and calls for relaxing them. We also suspect that this negative correlation
may be explained by the fact that Tier I capital is composed of CET1 capital that is subject to
regulatory requirements of its own, plus additional Tier I capital.
As far as the Tier 2 Capital is concerned, empirical findings from Table 3 show that Tier
2 capital ratio is also negatively and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The
negative sign of the coefficient of T2CR however is expected, as in Hypothesis 6, where we
conjecture that due to its supplementary nature, higher Tier 2 capital requirements have little to
zero impact on bank operating efficiency. To our expectation this time, the inverse relationship
between operating efficiency and Tier 2 capital ratio is confirmed through the empirical results
from Table 4, and we conclude that since Tier 2 capital is considered less reliable than Tier 1
capital due to the difficulty of its calculation as well as its asset composition, it impeded
operating efficiency by making the bank subject to unnecessary additional capital requirements.
In Table 5, we report fixed effects regression results with common equity Tier 1 capital
as the sole independent variable while controlling for the same bank-level and macroeconomiclevel control variable. To our expectation in Hypothesis 2, i.e. higher CET1 capital requirements
are a positively correlated to bank operating efficiency, we find that the sign of the (CET1)
coefficient is positively and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, proving that
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio (CET1) positively impacts the operating efficiency of large
commercial banks. This positive correlation helps us shed some light on the negative impact of
Tier 1 capital, of which CET1 is a component. Due to Tier 1 capital having being composed of
two different components (CET1) and Additional Tier 1 capital, and given that we detected a
positive impact of capital adequacy on efficiency, it may be possible that the impact of (CET1) is
dominant and helps explain the positive correlation between capital adequacy and operational
efficiency. Note that capital adequacy in this study is proxied by (CAR), which is defined as the
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ratio of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals to risk-weighted assets, which makes CET1 a part
of (CAR) in the process.
We then present the results of regressing operational efficiency on core capital leverage
requirements as proxied by the Tier 1 leverage ratio. Table 6 shows that Tier 1 leverage
requirements positively and significantly impact bank operating efficiency, a result that
confirms our Hypothesis 3 that higher leverage requirements positively impact U.S. commercial
banks and savings institutions’ operating efficiency. This finding bolsters the importance of the
leverage requirements as they are also subject to regulation under Basel III and commercial
banks are required to comply with them.
In Table 7, we report the results of regressing operational efficiency on credit risk. We
find that the coefficient of credit risk, as proxied by net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr), is a
statistically significant one at the 1% significance level, and that an inverse correlation exists
between bank efficiency and credit risk, indicating that any increase in net charge-offs leads to a
diminished bank operating efficiency. This finding is expected through Hypothesis 4 and
corroborates the findings of Lotto (2018) who also finds an inverse relationship between bank
efficiency and credit risk in commercial banks in Tanzania.
Moreover, we examine the impact of net interest margin (nimy) on operational efficiency
and the results are reported in Table 9. Results show that the coefficient of (nimy) is statistically
significant at the 1% significance level; and that a negative correlation exists between (nimy)
and bank operating efficiency. This negative correlation is unexpected since in hypothesis 5, we
expect net interest margin for U.S. commercial banks to be positively related to operating
efficiency.
Although (nimy) is not a part of the financial regulation requirements ratios; however, it
remains one of the most commonly used profitability ratios in financial analysis. An
explanation may be found in a recent statement of Chris Vanderpool, Senior Analyst at S&P
Global Market Intelligence who claims that in spite of positive prospects about the banking
industry in the fact that it seems healthy, banks across the board are well-capitalized, and credit
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quality is strong; loan growth has been sluggish and profit margins are compressed. It is true
that banks in the U.S. have been through a long recovery road and are healthier than they have
been in a decade (Forbes, 2017), there are still hurdles to be overcome just as those mentioned
above, which could explain the negative relationship between net interest margin and operating
efficiency.
Another possible explanation for the negative correlation we uncovered between net
interest margin and operating efficiency may be found in a recent study by Forbes on America’s
100 Best Banks. This is a study that aims to gauge the financial conditions of the U.S. largest
banks, ranking them based on ten metrics related to capital adequacy, profitability, asset
quality, and growth. Surprisingly, the 2017 ranking produces shocking results in that none of
the big four banks in the U.S. landed in the top 50 of America’s Best Banks, and the first factor
that Forbes study blames this on is “low net interest margins”, then “high levels of net chargeoffs as a percent of loans and leases, and weak revenue growth.” 11
Finally, financial regulation efforts in the wake of the financial crisis bolster our initial
claims of a positive association between the operating efficiency of U.S. commercial banks and
the body of financial regulation enacted through increased regulatory capital and leverage rules
and requirements. Unfortunately, financial regulatory efforts pre-crisis are found to have had a
negative impact on the operating efficiency of U.S. commercial banks; fueling the view that the
level of regulatory capital during the years leading to the financial crisis was frail and
inadequate to maintain bank solvency and guarantee sound banking operations.
9.1. Policy Implications:
As Claessens & Kodres (2014) claim, the financial system and economies has long
suffered from damage, and policymakers have attempted to remedy this damage through the
enactment of a large set of financial reforms, both at the international and domestic level. A part
of doing so was creating of FRB in 2009 and passing Basel III in 2010. This study examines,
among other, the effect of specific requirements under Basel III. Our empirical findings indicate
11

visit: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/01/10/full-list-ranking-americas-100-largest-banks/#1a902a9d4c5a
for the Forbes 2017 Ranking America’s Best 100 Banks.
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that capital adequacy should be every large bank’s major concern as it is an essential
determinant of its operating efficiency. Our results speak in favor of well-capitalization
practices, and lend support to those authorities enforcing regulation, through increasing capital
and leverage requirements. We believe that such regulatory requirements genuinely serve the
purpose of strengthening bank supervision and help establish guardrails against the unforeseen
risk of future financial crises. We also hope that policymakers keep those requirements in place
in spite of increasing pressures from banks and a heightened movement of resisting higher
capital requirements or demanding its immediate relaxing. Needless to mention how the recent
financial crisis has erupted and what type of corrective actions and measures it took to steer the
financial system in the U.S. back to safety. We are sure that a lesson or two have been learned.
10.

Conclusion
In what seems to be a long and slow route to recovery, rigorous bank and financial

regulatory acts are still needed to rectify flaws of the financial system, yet at the same time,
there are calls to soften bank sector regulation to boost commercial banking, while promoting
investment and lending activities.
This paper tackles what we believe to be one of the hottest topics within the financial
system nowadays, i.e. whether financial regulation benefits banks or impede their operations
instead. We closely examine 68 of the largest commercial banks in the U.S. with $15 billion or
more in consolidated assets that meet specific criteria. After controlling for bank-level
characteristics and macro-economic environment control variables, we regress operating
efficiency on a handful of explanatory variables, such as the basic capital and leverage
requirement ratios, a credit risk proxy, and a common profitability and financial soundness
measure. We find that one unit increase in the capital adequacy ratio increases operating
efficiency by 16.43% for large U.S. commercial banks; that operating efficiency increases by
7.52% for every single unit increase in CET1 requirements, and that for each unit increase in
leverage ratio, operating efficiency increases by 77.49%. Our empirical findings contribute to
studies closely examining the impact of regulation on bank efficiency by deciphering the
individual impacts of each component.
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In brief, we uncover the relevance of capital adequacy, credit risk management, and
leverage requirement in promoting large banks’ operating efficiency in the U.S., a necessary
requirement to sustain a healthy financial climate overall. Our findings corroborate those of
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2004) that bank supervision matters and are supported by
findings of Myers and Majluf (1984) that a positive relation exists between bank performance
and capital ratio, the latter being another proxy for capital adequacy.
As far as the direction of future research goes, given that the full compliance with the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) has not been established till January 2017, very little data exist
(2017-2018) since banks have only started disclosing their liquidity coverage requirement ratios
recently. LCR has an undeniable promising role in banking regulation, and future research may
be directed towards uncovering its impact on bank operating efficiency. Only then, the full
impact of all three categories of financial regulation under Basel III can be assessed and
conclusions could be made about its holistic effect in improving bank performance or setting it
back.
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CHAPTER 2
The Determinants of Sovereign Debt Issuance Choice: Sukuk Vs Conventional Bonds

1. Introduction and Motivation
There is a large need for debt financing by both corporations and governments, and
while corporate debt financing has been extensively covered in the literature, through its two
major components, conventional bonds and Sukuk, there are only shy attempts of approaching
government debt financing with its two distinct categories, sovereign conventional bond
issuance and sovereign Islamic Sukuk issuance.
Financing through the issuance of debt is classified as a major source for organizations
and central governments to obtain external funds. Today, debt issuance originates from two
main sources: conventional bonds and Sukuk. Sukuk are Islamic bonds that combine features of
stocks and conventional bonds altogether. They are regarded as an alternative instrument of
conventional bond in the financial market and have gained massive notoriety over the last two
decades (Haque et al. 2017).
In the beginning, the primary Sukuk market had started relatively small, totaling at
about USD 134 million in 2000. However, it considerably expanded from 2001 going forward,
with the primary market volume in 2016 being USD 88.3 billion (IIFM report, 2017) and recently
increasing to USD 116.7 billion in 2017 (IIFM report, 2018). This market is basically deeply
rooted in emerging countries, mainly members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) although Western countries in the caliber of UK and Luxembourg ventured into this
market through issuing sovereign Sukuk in 2014. Indeed, sovereign Sukuk, a type of Sukuk
issues by national governments, represent more than 55% of the Sukuk market. By the end of
2016, the total sovereign Sukuk issued raised to USD 472 billion (IIFM report, 2017).
Due to the remarkable expansion of the Sukuk market in the few recent years,
considerable research has been devoted to uncovering the reasons behind it; however, the
majority of those studies emphasize the determinants of corporate Sukuk market development
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(Said and Grassa, 2013, Azmat et al. 2014; Mohamed et al. 2015, Nagano, 2016 and 2017, and
Klein and Weill, 2016). Corporate Sukuk issuance is largely attributed to external and internal
factors (Grigorian, 2003); could be adversely affected by poor credit rating and political
instability (Thomas, 2009); and that access to credit markets is determined by country size
(Gelos et al., 2011). Moreover, specific characteristics of Sukuk coupled with the issuer’s
characteristics could potentially determine the choice between issuing Islamic or conventional
bonds (Grassa and Miniaoui, 2017).
To our knowledge, the topic of determinants of choice between sovereign Sukuk and
sovereign bonds has never been investigated before. We therefore capitalize on the lack of
studies dedicated to investigating the dynamics of sovereign debt issuance by looking at not
only conventional debt issue through sovereign bonds, but also Islamic debt issue through
sovereign Sukuk, a growing Islamic finance instrument, thus contributing to the growing
literature on Sukuk as well. Our research intends to investigate the determinants of sovereign
Sukuk issuance that have recently contributed to the development of Sukuk market. Here, we
provide empirical evidence that countries choose to issue Sukuk in ways consistent with
economic and finance theories.
The focal point of this paper is on answering the following question: What are the
significant determinants for sovereign debt issuer, i.e. a national government, to choose among
conventional bond and Sukuk issuance?
Sovereign or government debt refers to how much a country owes to outside creditor
and could be used interchangeably with public debt. Central governments usually issue
sovereign or national debt as a measure of financing their growth and development projects,
while relying on their stability and sovereign credit ratings to attract investors seeking
sovereign debt investments.
As sovereign debt arises as a result of accumulated annual deficits, historically,
governments have been employing a myriad of channels to finance their projects and raise
funding. This took place through either directly borrowing from banks, institutions, individuals
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or countries, or issuing Treasury bonds, bills, or notes. Governments of OIC countries in specific
rely on different debt instruments or tools to meet their foreign debt needs.
Nowadays, sovereign debt is an important cornerstone of many institutional investment
portfolios and is considered among the safest investments in most countries. Sovereign bonds
are particularly safer than most of the other alternatives since countries strive to keep an access
to credit markets in the future and make it a high priority to pay back debt and avoid defaulting
altogether. This leads to governments carefully assessing the risks associated with issuing
sovereign debts, knowing that defaulting on sovereign debts will stripe countries of any chance
of obtaining loans in the future or getting loans with favorable conditions and interest rates.
A default also renders the defaulting country less creditworthy and forces it to fulfill its
borrowing needs directly from world organizations such as the World Bank for instance.
Borrowing from such international financial institutions often comes with a higher cost and is
coupled with unfavorable interest rates and conditions. In brief, although alternative methods
of financing projects are available for central governments, such as raising taxes, reducing
spending, or printing more money, borrowing remains one of the favorable solutions given the
fact that governments will always be investing in new growth and development projects.
Hence, there will always likely be a rising demand for debt financing as a main venue of
funding for national governments.
This study uses a sample of 745 sovereign debts issued - consisting of 602 sovereign
bonds and 143 sovereign Sukuk- from 1995 to 2015 in 16 OIC countries (namely: Algeria,
Bahrain, Brunei Dar Al Salam, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Malaysia, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and UAE). Our findings provide evidence that issued
sovereign Sukuk are larger in size than the issued bonds and have longer maturities. Hence,
sovereign bonds issues are smaller in size and require higher margins to cover the potential risk
involved. Moreover, we provide evidence that countries with developed financial markets,
stronger economic indicators, higher credit quality, and stronger financial positions, are more
likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than conventional bonds. This preference tends to fuel
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the issuing countries’ strategy of diversification and development of their current financial
markets with the promotion of new debt tools.
Conversely, countries with weaker economics and financial positions are more likely to
opt for the traditional sovereign bond issuance. This preference towards classic debt tools is
justified by those countries’ non-readiness to venture into new sophisticated debt markets or
unwillingness to develop their traditional financial tools by trying on new debt tools such as
Sukuk for example.
Our analysis borrows from different strands of the literature on sovereign debt, helping
us to contribute to the literature on a myriad of levels. First, given the unique and distinct
features of conventional bonds versus Islamic Sukuk, we enrich the literature by presenting
evidence on how the factors determining issuance for sovereign Sukuk and conventional debt
may sometimes share similarities, but are also different on many other levels. Second, by
comparing sovereign bonds with sovereign Sukuks’ characteristics in the context of 16 OIC
countries, this study is an attempt to execute a comparative analysis on a government's issuance
motives as well as to assess what determines the issuers' specific preferences for sovereign
Sukuk. Third, to the best of our knowledge, we believe this is the first study that examines the
association between credit quality and the choice between issuing sovereign Sukuk or bonds;
given that a large body of literature is devoted to exploring the correlation between credit
quality and the choice between public and private debt. Finally, we hope to add to the ongoing
policy debate on the choice of government’s debt by linking our empirical findings to real world
practices to assist policymakers.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing
literature on Sukuk market. Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 5 discusses
regression results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The literature on the determinants of choice of debt identifies an alarming stream of
mixed results as reported by empirical studies exploring this phenomenon. Findings of
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Grigorian (2003) suggests the importance of both external and internal factors. In a study that
covers first-time and subsequent issues by emerging economies spanning 1980 through 2002,
Grigorian identifies factors such as a favorable fiscal position, low levels of inflation and high
levels of GDP per capita, as being the catalyst in deciding the type of issue. Additional factors
were identified by Thomas (2009) who claims that during the period of 1970–2006, low-income
developing countries could not easily access international capital markets due to internal factors
such as poor credit quality, in addition to external factors such as political instability.
In a study that examines a sample of 150 emerging economies spanning 1980 through
2000, Gelos et al. (2011) single out market access as a determinant of choice between sovereign
bond issues or borrowing through private syndicated bank loans. They show that the economic
size and prosperity of a country determine its access to credit market in that countries with
larger and developed economies find it an easy task to access international credit markets, but it
is also the institutional quality of its organizations that drives that market access. While
countries with bright financial and economic prospects have an easy access to international
credit markets, countries that are more vulnerable to shocks have a hard time tapping into those
markets.
Similarly, findings of Presbitero et al. (2016) suggest that factors such as large economic
size, higher GDP per capita, lower public debt, and a highly effective government, play a major
role in increasing a country’s probability of issuing bonds, as compared to non-issuing
counterparts. On a global factor level, their results confirm previous evidence of the higher
likelihood of issuances being associated with periods of global liquidity and higher commodity
prices.
While the bulk of empirical studies highlight conventional finance and focus on
developed capital markets, there exist certain recent evidences that differentiate between the
two main channels of issuing debt, i.e. Sukuk and conventional bonds. Furthermore, the
majority of those studies focus on corporate level. For instance, Nagano’s (2017) suggest that
choosing Sukuk issuance depends on the accessibility to the Sukuk market; which is a necessary
condition that needs to be met before other determinants could promote the use of Sukuk.
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Moreover, once the issuer has full access to the Sukuk market, Sukuk issuance is promoted by
the low degree of financial constraints on a firm, and the level of a firm’s undervaluation in the
pre-issuance period.
Taken together, there seems to be a pronounced preference for the Sukuk issuance along
with market timing, given that the pecking-order conditions of market accessibility are first
satisfied. Klein and Weil (2015) present evidence that information asymmetries and adverse
selection impact the choice of the Sukuk market. Godlewski et al. (2013) study how stock
market investors react during the days following Sukuk issuance in Malaysia only to detect a
negative market reaction following a sukuk issuance event; which is indicative of Sukuk having
a negative signal for the Sukuk-issuing firm. Sukuk appear to exacerbate the information
asymmetries inherent in a debt market and to be exposed to both moral hazard and adverse
selection problems, due to the nature of its structuring.
In a subsequent study to further investigate the negative market reaction, Godlewski,
Turk-Ariss, and in an attempt to further investigate this troublesome negative reaction, Weill
(2016) closely inspect how Sharia board may influence the stock market reaction following
sukuk issuance. Using a sample of sukuk from eight different countries, they find that a Sukuk
should have been approved by a religious committee before its issuance; the committee
scrutinizes its conformity and full compliance with the Islamic law (the Sharia). They find that
the choice of Sharia scholars is crucial to how shareholders react to the issuance; they conclude
that Sukuk are subject to an unseen Sharia-compliance risk that conventional bonds are not
subject to, and this exacerbates the differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds.
Azmat et al. (2014) suggest that there is very little commonality between Islamic
partnership-based bonds and equity and dissimilar to conventional bonds, the issuer’s stock
valuation has no impact on debt–equity targets associated with bond issuance from Islamic joint
venture. Their findings also suggest that bond's security and seniority should be the major focus
of bond issuers in lieu of their Islamic structure. Moreover, they find that security against real
asset bonds is not necessarily representative of ownership of the underlying asset.
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Findings of Mohamed et al.’s (2015) lend support to the trade-off theory conveyed
through the optimizing behavior of firms among issuers of Sukuk and conventional bonds
although with different issuance motives; they suggest it is chosen when firms are faced with
higher information asymmetry costs. In addition, their findings support that the pecking order
theory is implemented by issuers of partnership-based Sukuk and convertible bonds. They also
propose that although straight bond issuers and exchange-based Sukuk may share the same
goal or target, the trade-off view remains the choice of firms that enjoy higher sales growth.
All in all, most of previous cited works concentrate on corporate choice of debt between
sovereign Sukuk and conventional bonds. However, we believe that this is the first study to
ever investigate what truly determines the government choice of debt between sovereign Sukuk
and sovereign bonds. We therefore contribute to the growing literature on Sukuk market by
extending previous few empirical works and approaching a pristine research area.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We investigate the sovereign Sukuk and bond market in 16 Muslim countries namely:
Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei Dar Al Salam, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Malaysia,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and UAE, with issuances from 1995 to 2015
(See Table 1). The main source of data is the Zawya Database, a section of Thomson Reuters
Middle East and a reliable source of regional news, intelligence, company databases, and
information on the latest projects from across the MENA region. We employ the Zawya
database since it provides data on bond and Sukuk issuances alike, the size of the issuance,
specific issuance year, tenor, credit rating of the security, and issuance date.
Then, we match the sovereign conventional bond and Sukuk issuances with the issuing
country’s economic and financial characteristics within the same year following Grassa and
Miniaoui (2017). We match the issue of each country, given the year of issuance spanning from
1995 till 2015 with its corresponding macroeconomic indicators (economic size and growth,
interest rate, inflation rate, finance debt, and cumulative finance debt) in addition to financial
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characteristics (the size of Islamic banking system, financial market size, capital market size,
financial market development indicator, institutional indicator, institutional reserves, and
country credit rating) (see Table 3). This information was collected from multiple sources such
the Global Competitiveness Reports published by the IMF; and the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance (GDF) Database.
Moreover, we have used the Zawya Database to construct data on simultaneous and
previous issuance of sovereign Sukuk and bonds; and collected historical data on our
participating countries in terms of any previous sovereign default they have ever experienced.
As a part of investigating the determinants of government debt choice between
sovereign bonds and Sukuk issuances, and to stay true to the comparative analysis between
sovereign conventional bonds and Sukuk, we have chosen to remove those bond issuances
characterized by being hybrid from our analysis (asset-backed bonds and convertibles), while
including all Sukuk types.
We obtain an unbalanced panel of data, given the fact that countries in our sample have
distinctive issues of either sovereign conventional bonds or Sukuk throughout the sampling
period. Our final sample contains a total of 745 issuances made by 16 countries over the period
1995-2015; of which sovereign Sukuk represent 18.4% of the sample in terms of issues, making
the total amount of sovereign bond issued substantially inferior to the amount of sovereign
bonds. Table 10 presents the types of issuance per year.
Table 10: Sample Distribution of Issues by Year

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Bonds
3
3
4
6
3
5
4
4
8
4

Sukuk
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
60

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

7
12
7
18
21
22
25
45
113
157
131
602

4
4
2
1
4
5
7
19
25
30
39
143

3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 displays the descriptive characteristics of the sovereign Sukuk and bond
issuances. We observe that on average, sovereign Sukuk are larger compared to sovereign
bonds. Additionally, the average margin of the sovereign bonds is higher than what observed in
sovereign Sukuk. However, the median maturity of sovereign debt is considerably and
substantially longer for sovereign Sukuk issuances.
There results indicate that both sovereign Sukuk and conventional bonds markets may
be highly differentiated; which is naturally inherited from the fact that governments have
different needs for financing. Results also show that the market is strongly segmented, with
sovereign bond issuers dominating in issuance size, as compared to their Sukuk issuing
counterparts. This may be linked to the potential view that it is the economic and financial
underlying circumstances within issuing countries that mandate the type of issuance.
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics by Issuance Type
Table 11 provides the major summary statistics of our data: the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum of Islamic and conventional bond issuances in the sample. The amount of issues is represented in USD
millions and the maturity is expressed in number of years.

Sovereign Conventional Bonds:
Variable
Size

Mean
18.81508

Median
18.47831

St. Dev.
1.568661

Min
13.12835

Max
22.39722

Margin

6.066744

.05254

3.598922

.473

17

61

Tenor
Previous Issue
Simultaneous
Issue
Sovereign default
Regulation
Institutional
Quality
Institutional
Reserves
Finance Debt
Cumulative
Finance Debt
Credit Rating
GDP

6.462063
.1143847
.0833333

5
0
0

5.602524
.3185542
.2766256

1
0
0

30
1
1

.4540728
3.918216
4.30048

0
3.9
4.4

.4983182
.551655
.703654

0
2.4
2.657816

1
5.2
5.945494

8.53e+08

9.31e+08

2.91e+09

-5.79e+0

5.04e+09

62.94988
194115

66.82353
86093

15.74261
232561.3

1.900876
0

85.78853
795741

6.095486
1.13e+11

5
5.57e+10

1.518436
1.05e+11

5
1.982548

9
6.72e+11

Interest Rates

4.381698

4.716667

1.060882

1.6425

5.741667

INF

4.474513

3.271702

3.119531

.5833084

10.1458

GDP Per Capita
Islamic Finance
Size
Fin. Mkt Size
Capital Market
Size

10513.79
10.07911

3976.966
9.625743

12651.16
7.837695

2653.899
1.794681

38184.86
29.67921

66.48266
57.55331

71.32864
67.63248

31.5326
25.48456

6.925822
8.350541

179.0929
156.2479

Variable
Size

Mean
19.79941

Median
20.29248

St. Dev.
1.194095

Min
17.12075

Max
21.37686

Margin
Tenor
Previous Issue
Simultaneous
Issue
Sovereign default
Regulation
Institutional
Quality
Institutional
Reserves
Finance Debt
Cumulative
Finance Debt
Credit Rating
GDP

4.149453
7.23209
.9323308
.2932331

. 03899
6.75
1
0

1.653025
5.985642
.252127
.4569655

.18
.2
0
0

11.25
34
1
1

0
5.197222
5.140226

0
5.2
5.1

0
.3667874
.33627

0
4.3
4.526371

1
5.6
5.945494

-5.72e+08

-6.58e+08

4.60e+09

-5.79e+09

5.04e+09

49.64918
354400

52.67475
460718

10.04901
197318.9

0
946

54.49153
548990

8.164179
2.72e+11

8
2.97e+11

.6276107
1.34e+11

7
1.44e+10

10
6.50e+11

Interest Rates
INF

2.414635
2.425594

1.805
2.097

1.073426
.8610653

1.6425
.5833084

5.741667
5.440782

Sovereign Sukuk:
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GDP Per Capita
Islamic Finance
Size
Financial Market
Size
Capital Market
Size

17512.99
12.8957

10878.39
11.08931

10861.29
10.42141

8236.022
1.794681

38184.86
29.67921

118.6687

129.2603

30.54438

35.53503

168.0671

109.8746

129.008

36.35128

26.08485

147.9527

3.3 Methodology and Hypotheses Development
As part of investigating the determinants of sovereign Sukuk or bond choice, we have
chosen to employ a specific econometric technique for dynamic panel data models (DPD) in this
research since it features characteristics of both time series and cross-sectional data. For similar
studies, the literature shows a tendency of using the Probit model as advanced by Greene (2003)
and Kumar et al. (2010) and based on a binary outcome dependent variable where the predicted
probabilities are limited between 0 and 1. In fact, since the Probit model specifies a binary
response model, it is perfect for establishing a link between the discrete variable and its
determinants. However, in modeling techniques involving the Probit model, the latter may
suffer from unobserved heterogeneity and/or endogeneity flaws. Moreover, traditional
techniques have been widely used in a myriad of previous studies, such as the two-stage
procedure (2SLS) destined to estimate the partial adjustment model of debt (Fama and French,
2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; and Byoun, 2008).
However, critics for the former econometric techniques have emerged, blaming them for
producing biased estimates in dynamic panel data models, especially when panel lengths are
short or when individual firm fixed-effects are present (Laisney and Lechner, 2003, Lemmon et
al., 2008, Baltagi, 2008, and Huang and Ritter, 2009).
Therefore, in this study, we adopt the largely popular Logit model in analyzing the
binary outcome dependent variable, i.e., governments’ choice of sovereign debt. The Logit
model is a binary outcome model that has a different functional form than the Probit model.
Binary models are among the most popular in applied economics and the model estimates the
probability that Y, the dependent variable, is a binary outcome, with Y = 1 as a function of the
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explanatory variables. In the logit model, we model the probability of Y equal 1, so instead of
modeling the value of Y itself, we are modeling the probability that Y would be taking the value
of 1, and in this case, we identify the government choice of debt to be the issuance of sovereign
Sukuk when Y=1.
Y = The government’s choice of sovereign debt as:
Y = 1 if the choice of debt is sovereign Sukuk
0 if the choice of debt is sovereign conventional bonds.
We conjecture that the government's choice of sovereign debt is determined by four
major categories of variables:
-

Specific Issue Characteristics

-

Country’s Macroeconomic Indicators, i.e. Economic Characteristics

-

Country’s Financial Development Indicators, i.e. Financial Characteristics

-

Specific Events

Table 12: Data Sources

Variables

Measured by

Source

Issue Characteristics
Issuance Size (Size)
Issuance Tenor (Tenor)
Margin (Margin)

Log of total amount issued
Number of years
Margin percentage

Zawya database
Zawya database
Zawya database

Macroeconomic Indicators
Economic size ( GDP )

GDP at purchasing power

World Bank

parity (EC size)/
Interest rates (INTER)

Population (POP)
Interest rate spread(lending
rate minus LIBOR)

World Bank

Inflation (INF)
The economic growth

Inflation Rate
GDP per capita

World Bank
World Bank

(GDP per capita)
Finance Debt (FDEBT)

Central government debt to

World Bank
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Cumulative Finance Debt
(Cumulative F. D.)

Financial Development
Indicators
Islamic banking system size
(IFSIZE)
Financial Market size
(FINMART)
Capital market capitalization

GDP (%)
Equal to total finance debt in
the last 3 years

Islamic financial assets to
GDP
Financial system deposits to

World Bank

Grassa and Gazdar (2013)
World Bank

GDP (%)
Stock market

World Bank

(CAPMART)
Regulation

Financial market development World Competitiveness
indicator score (1-7)
Report

Institutional Quality

the Institutions Indicator (a World Competitiveness
score of 1-7)
Report

Institutional Reserves
Country credit rating

(months of imports)
Rating

World Bank
S&P Rating Agency

Events
Previous Sukuk Issuance

Dummy variable equals 1 Zawya Database
when the government i has
experienced Sukuk issuance
in the past 3 years and 0
otherwise.

Simultaneous Issuance

Dummy variable equals to 1 if Zawya Database
the government has issued
both sukuk and conventional
bond in the same year.
Dummy variable equals 1 if World Bank
the
government
has
experienced a default and 0
otherwise.

Sovereign Default
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Table 12 establishes the guidelines for our data variables and their respective sources.
We identify four distinct categories as possible determinants of a government’s choice of
sovereign debt (Specific issue characteristics, the country’s macroeconomic indicators, the
country’s financial development indicators; in addition to specific Events).
As far as issue characteristics are concerned, a government’s issue size is measured by
the log of total amount of issued debt; the issuance tenor refers to the number of years debt is
held for; and margin represents the amount of collateral the holder of debt is obligated to
deposit with a counterparty to cover all or part of the credit risk exposure. Macroeconomic
indicators include economic size and growth, which are depicted through GDP and GDP per
Capita respectively; interest rates represent the resulting spread of lending rate minus LIBOR;
inflation is proxied by inflation rate; finance debt represented through the ratio of central
government debt to GDP; and cumulative finance debt as the total finance debt in the last 3
years. Financial characteristics of financial development indicators encompass the Islamic
banking system size as the ratio of Islamic financial assets to GDP; the financial market size as
the percentage of financial system deposits to GDP; market capitalization of the stock market;
regulation represented through the financial market development indicator score; institutional
quality represented by the countries’ institutions indicator; institutional reserves depicted by
months of imports; and the countries’ credit rating as provided by S&P credit rating agency.
Finally, the events we are considering in this study can be categorized under previous Sukuk
issuance, a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government has experienced Sukuk issuance in
the past 3 years, and 0 otherwise; simultaneous issuance, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
government has issued both Sukuk and conventional bonds in the same year; and the event of
sovereign default, another dummy variable that equals 1 if the government has experienced a
sovereign defaults and 0 otherwise.
Hypotheses Development:
As a part of our effort in investigating the determinants or factors behind a
government’s choice of a specific sovereign debt channel, we follow the conventional finance
popular view of Grigorian (2003) that both external and internal factors matter in the choice of
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debt. We hypothesize that analogous to firms seeking debt, a plethora of internal and external
factors do affect governments’ choice of sovereign debt. Internal factors may come in the form
of the country’s own financial characteristics as conveyed by its financial development
indicators; its financial characteristics, or the specific events the country experiences, whether it
is a previous sovereign default or a simultaneous issue of sovereign conventional and Sukuk for
instance.
Hypothesis 1: Both internal and external factors matter in a government’s choice of sovereign
debt.
According to Gelos et al. (2011), larger and richer countries are more likely to access
credit markets. In line with this view, we conjecture that countries with developed credit
markets, larger financial markets, larger size of finance debt, and higher country credit ratings,
may have better incentives to develop their current credit markets by having access to newlydeveloped credit instruments, i. e. sovereign Sukuk, thus are more likely to issue sovereign
Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional bonds.
Hypothesis 2: Larger and richer countries are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than
sovereign conventional bonds.
Following Presbitero et al. (2016), we believe that a handful of determinants interact
together to influence a country’s choice of sovereign debt. We hypothesize that the choice of
sovereign debt hinges on a plethora of factors, such as the level of a country’s economic
development as shown by its economic indicators (economic size and growth) as well as its
financial characteristics (level of finance debt, size of financial market, Islamic banking system
size, quality of institutions and reserves, country credit rating, etc).
Hypothesis 3: A government’s choice of a sovereign debt mechanism is influenced by financial
development indicators, as well as macroeconomic indicators.

Nagano (2017) argues that one of the necessary conditions in choosing Sukuk over
conventional bond issuance is the ability to access Sukuk market, and that a low level of
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financial constraints may lead to preferring the Sukuk market. We posit that countries that
enjoy a larger Islamic finance system and favorable country credit ratings are more inclined
towards issuing sovereign Sukuk.
Hypothesis 4: Countries with larger Islamic finance systems and favorable country credit
ratings are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional bonds.
Godlewski et al. (2013) discuss that issuance of sukuk may transmit a signal to the
general public. We conjecture that specific events at the level of the country may have an impact
on the type of debt issuance as countries experience different circumstances.

Hypothesis 5: Countries with simultaneous or previous issue are more likely to issue Sukuk
rather than conventional bonds.
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3; they are captured by the latent utility
shown in the following equation:
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + β4 Financial Market Size + β5 Islamic Finance Size + β6
Previous Sukuk Issuance + β7 Simultaneous Sukuk Issuance + β8 Country Credit Rating + β9 GDP+
β10 Inflation+ β11 Interest Rate + ε
*When estimating the model, sovereign Sukuk (with Yi = 1) is used as the base case against
which the sovereign bond (with Yi = 2) choices are compared.
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix
The correlation matrix shows a mix of positive and negative correlations between each debt securities ratio principles with a countries’ specific determinant variables and debt
characteristics. We notice low correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables and we conclude that our analysis is indicative of the fact that multi-collinearity issue is not
detrimental to the results of our regression analysis.

Size
Size

1.000

Margin

0.2025*

Margin

Tenor

Prev. Issue

Simultaneous
Issue

Sovereign

Regulation

Inst. Q.

Debt

RATING

IFSIZE

FINMART

1.000

Tenor

0.1109*

0.1207*

1.000

Prev. Issue

0.3154*

-0.2438*

0.0207

1.000

Simult. Issue

0.1455*

-0.1836*

-0.0939*

0.5426*

1.000

Sovereign

-0.4639*

-0.0687

-0.1571*

-0.4623*

-0.2774*

1.000

Regulation

0.2465*

-0.3597*

0.0943*

0.7681*

0.3546*

-0.2602*

1.000

Inst. Qlty

0.1003*

-0.4051*

-0.0111

0.6554*

0.5330*

-0.0594

0.8145*

1.000

Debt

0.2788*

0.7046*

-0.0184

0.1608*

-0.1289*

-0.3787*

-0.0458

-0.2692*

1.000

RATING

0.2503*

-0.4520*

0.1819*

0.6674*

0.4408*

-0.5941*

0.5818*

0.5673*

-0.1036*

1.000

IFSIZE

0.1091*

-0.4370*

-0.2195*

0.3051*

0.3477*

-0.1074*

0.2306*

0.2871*

-0.3650*

0.4035*

1.000

FINMART

0.1101*

-0.4365*

0.0272

0.5230*

0.1084*

-0.0821*

0.7201*

0.3963*

-0.1456*

0.3818*

0.2099*

*** Significant at 1%,** significant at 5% and* significant at 10%.
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1.000

A mix of positive and negative correlations between the variables in our main equation emerge
from the correlation matrix in Table 13, and for the most part, we notice that the correlation
coefficients among the independent variables are low, which indicates that the multicollinearity is not a detrimental issue to our regression analysis results.
From the one hand, the correlation matrix shows a negative and significant correlation
between an OIC country’s credit rating and margin (-0.4520), which justifies that countries with
a low credit rating are less credible or less credit-worthy and are then required to present higher
margins to cover up some or all of the potential credit risk exposure. From the other hand, a
country’s debt and its financial market size are negatively and significantly correlated at the
10% significance level (-0.1456), which indicates that countries with strong financial markets
have lower levels of debt or rely less on debt markets to fulfill their financing needs. A country’s
credit rating and its level of debt are negatively correlated (-0.1036), which indicates that an OIC
country’s credit market accessibility hinges on their sovereign credit rating score and confirms
the above finding. That is, the better the credit quality for a country, the less its reliance on debt
channel although it has greater access to the credit market.
The size of Islamic banking system for an OIC country is negatively correlated with its
level of debt (-0.3650), which is indicative of the fact that countries with higher dependence on
government debt financing are less likely to tap into Sukuk market and most likely prefer the
regular conventional bond issuance instead. Moreover, an OIC country’s credit rating and its
Islamic banking system size are significantly and positively correlated at the 10% significance
level (0.4035). This indicates that OIC countries with relatively higher credit quality have a
tendency to prefer issuing sovereign sukuk rather than conventional bonds. This strategy may
be linked to those countries’ willingness to explore and take advantage of newly-developed
credit tools as a part of developing and revolutionizing their own credit markets.
Islamic finance size and margin are negatively correlated (-0.4370), that is, countries that
rely on sovereign Sukuk as a major source of financing are required to hold lower margins as
opposed to their counterparts relying on conventional sovereign bonds, a finding that was
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conveyed in the initial descriptive statistics when we noted that on average, the margin of the
sovereign bond is higher than what observed in sovereign Sukuk.
Due to the positive correlation between Islamic banking size and the level of
institutional quality within a country (0.2871), we can also conclude that countries with higher
institutional quality scores are more likely to tap into sovereign Sukuk credit market. On a
similar note, the negative correlation between the institutional quality and the level of debt (0.2692) reveals that countries that enjoy higher levels of institutional quality tend to rely less on
debt markets, possibly preferring other channels of financing.
Finally, the negative correlation between an OIC country regulation as proxied by the
financial market development indicator score and its corresponding level of debt (-0.0458)
uncovers that the more developed a financial market is, the less its dependence on debt as a
financing medium. Moreover, highly regulated countries with elevated levels of financial
market development indicators are more likely to tap into sovereign Sukuk markets rather than
conventional bond markets, as depicted by the positive correlation between regulation and
Islamic finance size (0.2306).

4. Results and Main Findings
This section displays and comments on the results of the study. We first present our
main findings then display our robustness checks.
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Table 14: Main Regression Results
Table 14 reports our main estimations using the logit model. The determinants of the sovereign target debt security issuance reveal
a mixed but significant relationship between a country’s economic and financial conditions, debt characteristics and special events
that take place within the countries’ debt market. We observe that debt maturity, debt margin and issuance size have no
explanatory power on determining sovereign Sukuk issuance. Results indicate that countries with previous Sukuk issuance within
the last three years are more likely to issue Sukuk within the year, while the simultaneous issues of both Sukuk and bonds have no
significant impact on sovereign Sukuk issuance. It remains unclear whether historical sovereign defaults reported in the history of
participating OIC countries have any impact on the preference of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds.

Islamic Sukuk

Coef

Std. Err.

Z

P > lzl

[95%
Confidence
Interval]

Issue Size

-1.03e-09

2.40e-09

-0.43

0.667

-5.73e-09

3.67e-09

Margin

1.349187

.9207603

1.47

0.143

-.4554699

3.153844

Tenor

-.1700677

.29070359

-0.59

0.559

-.7398361

.3997006

10.3114

4.087588

2.52

0.012

2.299886

18.32294

1.881665

2.511921

0.75

0.454

-3.041609

6.80494

-.3142197

1.567972

-0.20

0.841

-3.387388

2.758949

3.617452

1.274166

2.84

0.005

1.120132

6.114773

1.01

0.314

-.0575289

.179015

2.52
-2.39

0.012
0.017

.0957558
-6.679083

.7680993
-.6587295

Previous Issuance
Simultaneous Issue
Country Credit Rating
Interest Rates
Financial Market Size
Islamic Finance Size
Inflation Rate

.060743
.439275
-3.668906

.0603439
.175194
1.535833

GDP

1.00e-11

3.86e-11

2.59

0.010

2.45e-11

-.6587295

_cons

-43.21115

15.82947

-2.73

0.006

-74.23635

-12.18595

Table 14 reports our main estimations using the Logit model. The determinants of the
sovereign target debt security issuance reveal a mixed but significant relationship between the
choice of debt issuance and the different economic and financial conditions of a country, its debt
characteristics and special events that take place within its debt market.
This table reports our main estimations using the Logit model. The determinants of the
sovereign target debt security issuance reveal a mixed but significant relationship between the
choice of debt issuance and the different economic and financial conditions of a country, its debt
characteristics and special events that take place within its debt market. We observe that debt
maturity, debt margin and issuance size have no explanatory power on determining sovereign
Sukuk issuance.
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In investigating the impact of specific events such as previous sovereign Sukuk issuance
within the same year, simultaneous sovereign Sukuk and bonds issuance, or historical default,
results indicate that countries with previous Sukuk issuance within the last three years are more
likely to issue Sukuk within the year, while the simultaneous issues of both Sukuk and bonds
have no significant impact on sovereign Sukuk issuance. It remains unclear whether historical
sovereign defaults reported in the history of participating OIC countries have any impact on the
preference of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds.
As far as country credit rating is concerned, our results indicate that the OIC credit
ratings have no statistical significance in the choice of sovereign Sukuk issuance.
These results of a strong preference for issuing sovereign Sukuk rather than bonds when
countries have a larger Islamic finance market provide evidence that characteristics such as
more developed Islamic finance market lead to a higher preference towards issuing sovereign
Sukuk rather than bonds as a means of developing current debt markets and diversifying debt
products by selecting the relatively-new and sophisticated debt tool, the Sukuk. These findings
partially confirm hypothesis 4.
As far as interest rates are concerned, we conclude that they possess an explanatory
power when it comes to deciding on the sovereign sukuk issuance, and the positive correlation
between interest rates and the issue of Islamic Sukuk indicates that OIC countries with higher
interest rate spread are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional
bonds.
Our results also show that on the financial market development side, the financial
market size has no statistical power in determining sovereign Sukuk issuance, contrary to our
finding that countries with larger Islamic finance size are more inclined towards sovereign
Sukuk issuance as well.
We also find that economic size, as represented by GDP, is positively correlated with
sovereign Sukuk issuance. We conclude that countries with large economies prefer to issue

73

sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds; confirming hypothesis 2, and since large
economies have a strong potential to advance and develop their debt markets by venturing into
new debt securities, Sukuk may be a perfect candidate for those sophisticated new debt
products. Our finding is consistent with Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and
Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bk (2009) with regards to debt market development.
4.1 Robustness Tests:
Now for robustness check, we run the following logit regressions to control for the
institutional effect, the debt effect and the institutional reserves effect, respectively.
For the institutional effect, we posit that the issuance of Sukuk, yi, is determined by financial
development indicators in the form of the country’s regulation and institutional quality, as
proxied by the financial market development indicator score and the institutions indicator score
respectively. The following Logit regression illustrates the model:
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + β4 Regulation + β5 Institutional Quality + + β6 GDP+ β7
GDP Per Capita + ε
Table 15: Control of the Institutional Effect
Table 15 results highlight the institutional effect in issuing Islamic Sukuk by indicating that the degree of regulation is a significant
determinant of Sukuk issuance activity. While the institutional quality is found to have no explanatory power in the choice of
sovereign Sukuk over sovereign bonds, the financial market development indicator is statistically significant and indicates that the
degree of regulation is a significant determinant of Sukuk issuance activity. We conclude that OIC countries with higher financial
market development scores are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional bonds.

Islamic Sukuk

Coef
Issue Size

Std. Err.

Z

P > lzl

[95%
Confidence
Interval]

1.44e-09

6.84e-10

2.10

0.036

9.49e-09

2.78e-09

Margin

-.1746252

.17308

-1.01

0.313

-.5138556

.1646053

Tenor

.0186007

.0457208

0.41

0.684

-.0710103

.1082118

Regulation

3.955595

.9711849

4.07

0.000

2.052108

5.859082

.7479429

1.012503

0.74

0.460

-1.236527

2.732413

.7474537

.2963166

2.52

0.012

.1666838

1.328224

-.0000695

.0000217

-3.21

0.001

-.0001119

-.000027

Institutional Quality
GDP
GDP per Capita
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_cons

-.41.24601

7.762038

-5.31

0.000

-56.45933

-26.0327

Table 15 results highlight the institutional effect in issuing Islamic Sukuk by indicating
that the degree of regulation is a significant determinant of Sukuk issuance activity. While the
institutional quality is found to have no explanatory power in the choice of sovereign Sukuk
over sovereign bonds, the financial market development indicator is found to be statistically
significant and indicative of the fact that the degree of regulation is a significant determinant of
Sukuk issuance activity. We conclude that OIC countries with higher financial market
development scores are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign
conventional bonds.
To investigate the debt effect in influencing the issuance of Sukuk, we rely on the
following regression model that highlights two macroeconomic indicators, finance debt and
cumulative finance debt, as possible determinants of sovereign debt issuance yi. Finance debt is
proxied by the percentage of the central government debt to GDP while the cumulative finance
debt is represented through the total finance debt within a country in the last three years.
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + β4 Finance Debt + β5 Cumulative Finance Debt + ε
Table 16: Control of the Debt Effect
Table 16 results reveal a colossal debt effect in determining the choice of sovereign debt as pronounced through the statistical
significance of finance debt in issuing Sukuk. As the results indicate, OIC countries with higher levels of finance debt are more
likely to prefer the issuance of sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds; the cumulative finance debt does not seem to have a
statistical significance in determing the sovereign debt choice.

Islamic Sukuk

Coef
Issue Size

Std. Err.

Z

P > lzl

[95%
Confidence
Interval]

-4.28e-11

7.26e-10

-0.06

0.953

-1.46e-09

1.38e-09

Margin

-.1272106

.2998211

-0.42

0.671

-.7148491

.4604278

Tenor

-.1335644

.059028

-2.26

0.024

-.2492571

-.0178717

Cumulative Finance Debt

3.37e-11

3.55e-11

0.95

0.342

-3.58e-11

1.03e-10

.0969591

.0349707

2.77

0.006

.0284177

.1655004

-2.685425

1.890697

-1.42

0.156

-6.391123

1.020273

Finance Debt
_cons
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Table 16 results reveal a colossal debt effect in determining the choice of sovereign debt
as pronounced through the statistical significance of finance debt in issuing Sukuk. As the
results indicate, OIC countries with higher levels of finance debt are more likely to prefer the
issuance of sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds; the cumulative finance debt does not
seem to have a statistical significance in determining the sovereign debt choice.
Finally, to investigate the institutional reserves effect, we run the following Logit
regression model where the impacts of both finance debt and institutional reserves are
accounted for:
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + + β4 Institutional Reserves + β5 Finance Debt + ε
Table 17: Control of the Institutional Reserves Effect
Table 17 confirm the impact of finance debt in determining the sovereign choice of debt while indicating that institutional reserves
have no statistical significance in determining the sovereign debt choice.

Islamic Sukuk

Coef
Issue Size

Std. Err.

Z

P > lzl

[95%
Confidence
Interval]

2.39e-09

5.42e-10

4.40

0.000

1.32e-09

3.45e-09

Margin

-.5398642

.1995887

-2.70

0.007

-.9310508

-.1486776

Tenor

.0547273

.0400852

1.37

0.172

-.0238383

.1332929

Institutional Reserves

1.00e-11

3.09e-11

0.32

0.745

-5.06e-11

7.07e-11

-.0252389

.0140618

0.073

0.073

-.0527995

.0023217

.1807873

1.000025

0.857

0.857

-1.779226

2.140801

Finance Debt
_cons

Results from Table 17 confirm the impact of finance debt in determining the sovereign
choice of debt while indicating that institutional reserves have no statistical significance in
determining the sovereign debt choice.
5.

Conclusion
Previous researches have paid little attention to understand the determinants of issuers’

choice between sovereign Sukuk and sovereign bonds. Therefore, this study tries to fill this gap
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by analyzing the reasons why governments prefer to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than
sovereign bonds. Our study focuses on 745 debts issued (143 sovereign Sukuk and 602
sovereign bonds) by 16 Muslim countries, members of OIC, observed during the period from
1995 to 2015.
Our findings provide strong evidence that the determinants for government's choice to
issue sovereign Sukuk or sovereign bonds are different. Countries with strong economic
indicators, developed financial markets, strong Islamic finance markets are more likely to issue
sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds as a strategy to develop and diversify their
financial markets by promoting new debt products. However, countries with weaker economies
and frail financial positions are more likely to opt for sovereign bond issuance. Weaker
economies may have neither the willingness nor the financial means to develop new debt
instruments. Therefore, they choose the classic debt market.
Our paper contributes to the existing economic and finance literature by providing
evidence on the motives for national governments to issue sovereign Sukuk or conventional
bonds. Moreover, we believe this is the first paper to examine the factors determining a
government’s choice between sovereign Sukuk and conventional bonds in 16 OIC countries.
As far as the direction for future research goes, with additional data becoming readily
available in the future, we can further investigate the determinants of sovereign debt issue by
examining the different structures of bonds and Sukuk, given the fact that there exist multiple
types of Sukuk contracts (Ijarah, Musharakah, Murabahah, Istisna, Salam, Wakalah, and
Mudarabah), and it may be very interesting to look at the possible determinants of issuing
different types of Sukuk, and whether those determinants vary according to the type of Sukuk
issued. Moreover, it may be interesting to study the debt security choices across a multitude of
different sectors. Finally, a further categorization may be considered as well; that is, looking at
sovereign debt from two different perspectives, internal debt versus external debt.
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